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I. INTRODUCTION

Bushrod Washington was appointed to the United States Supreme Court by
President John Adams in 1798.1 Nephew of George Washington, committed to the
principles of the Federalist Party, and only thirty-six years old, he was the youngest
Justice ever appointed to the Court at that time.2 Washington would serve on the
Court until his death in 1829, a period of nearly thirty-one years.
The period of Washington's service on the Supreme Court was marked by
United States District Judge for the Southern District of West Virginia. B.A. West Virginia
University, 1964; J.D. Yale University, 1967; LL.M. University of Virginia, 1998.
This Article, in a slightly different form, was submitted to the faculty of the University of Virginia
as a thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Laws in the Judicial Process,
Graduate Program for Judges, University of Virginia School of Law, April 9, 1998. Professor G. Edward
White, my thesis advisor, patiently read several drafts and made numerous helpful suggestions - he bears no
responsibility for any errors which remain. Kent C. Olson, Assistant Librarian for Public Services at the
University of Virginia Law Library, was especially helpful in identifying and obtaining source materials. My
secretary for many years, Linda F. Kinder, typed and proofread the manuscript and was an invaluable contact
with several libraries in the federal system. Judge Irene M. Keeley of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of West Virginia encouraged me to offer this Article for publication; more importantly, she
encouraged the West Virginia Law Review to accept it. My colleagues on the United States District Court for
the Southern District of West Virginia, especially Chief Judge Charles H. Haden II and Senior District Judge
Elizabeth Hallanan, made it possible for me to attend the Graduate Program for Judges at the University of
Virginia where this Article was generated.
I

Clare Cushman, Bushrod Washington, in THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES:

ILLUSTRATED

BIOGRAPHIS, 1789-1995 at 53 (Clare Cushman ed., 2d ed. 1995).
2
Sce DAvID LESLIE ANNiS, MR. BUSHROD WASHINGTON, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE ON THE
MARSHALL COURT 71 (1974) (Ph.D. diss., University of Notre Dame).
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dramatic social, cultural, and economic change. A new nation was constructed
upon the ruins of the British monarchy in America; a new nation which required a
new legal system. Professor Gilmore, in The Ages of American Law, offered his
view of how courts and the legal profession responded to this challenge. He
perceived this era as the "Age of Discovery" in American law, an "explosion of
creative energy." 3 American courts, Gilmore maintained, set out in quest of a
distinctly American law 4 - a law which had to be accommodated to the spirit of
the frontier5 and the process of industrialization.6 Similarly, Professor Horwitz, in
The Transformation of American Law, discerned a sea change in the very function

of law in America between 1780 and 1820. It moved, he said, from a device to
decide individual cases to an instrument of social change.7
For both Gilmore and Horwitz, Joseph Story is the prototypical judge of
the age, routinely assuming jurisdiction over issues thought in other countries "to
lie well beyond the limits of judicial competence,"' and writing "classically
transitional" judicial opinions "filled with ambiguities sufficient to make any
future legal developments possible." 9 A Harvard law professor, Story was "deeply
learned in many legal subjects ...

and a prolific author of commentaries."' 0 His

opinions tend to be long discourses on the law, liberally adorned with obiter dicta.
They contrast with the work of Chief Justice Marshall, whose constitutional
opinions often disdain citation of authority and rely heavily on internal reasoning.
Marshall attained greatness through his opinions and produced timeless results, but
his opinions often lack the mark of scholarship. One writer described them as
"powerful, but unscholarly, olympian, but redundant."'"
In life, Bushrod Washington was the personal friend, judicial ally, and
intellectual companion of both Story and Marshall. In death, his memory is
overshadowed by theirs. Washington's reputation, secure in his own day, has
suffered with the passage of time. Senator Albert J. Beveridge, in his great
biography of Marshall, referred to Washington as "the slow-thinking Bushrod
Washington."' 12 This characterization, however inaccurate, has become the modem
conception of Washington. The nadir was reached in 1970 when Isidore Silver,
writing for Commonweal magazine, described Washington's achievements as
3

GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 39 (1977).

4

See id. at 21.
See id.

6

See id. at 24.
See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 4
(1992).

8

GILMORE,

supra note 3, at 35.

HORWITZ, supra note 7, at 39.
10

CARL B. SWISHER, The Taney Period: 1836-64 in 5 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

UNITED STATES 40 (Paul A. Freund ed., 1974).
GEORGE DANGERFIELD, THE ERA OF GOOD FEELINGS
163 (1952).
12

1 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 158 (1916-19).
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"utterly insignificant."' 3 The volumes in the History of the United States Supreme
Court by Professors Haskins and Johnson 14 and White' 5 and a recent article by
James R. Stoner, Jr.,'6 have done much to correct the record, but Washington
remains under-appreciated, crowded from the stage by his better-known colleagues.
This Article attempts a reassessment of Justice Washington's judicial
impact and historical significance, and asks whether he fits the mold of the typical
judge of the Age of Discovery as described by Gilmore and Horwitz. It begins with
a description of the historical context in which Washington lived and worked,
considers his legal training and career as a lawyer, and proceeds to an analysis of
selected opinions.
Bushrod Washington wrote eighty-one separate opinions in Supreme Court
cases. In addition, as was the practice for justices in his day, he "rode circuit;" that
is, he sat as a trial and appellate judge in the circuit courts of the United States.
Almost six-hundred of Washington's circuit court opinions have been published. 7
Because of the volume of Washington's published works, a comprehensive
assessment of all his opinions is beyond the scope of this Article. The cases
discussed herein are limited to four areas which represent Washington's judicial
principles in the context of the important legal issues of his age. The goal of this
Article is to situate Justice Washington's career in the historical framework in
which he worked; the Article addresses cases which had particular significance for
that time period or which are especially revealing with regard to Justice
Washington's judicial philosophy and temperament. The four areas are
constitutional cases, maritime law (particularly marine insurance and prize cases),
western lands, and a miscellaneous category involving slavery and criminal law.
The assessment of any judge or justice's work and thought must begin with
his or her view of the Constitution and the proper judicial role in constitutional
cases. Washington did not write often for the Supreme Court in constitutional
cases, but his opinions which do exist, including circuit opinions which touch on
constitutional issues, are revealing. The next two categories of cases represent two
directions in which the energy of the young republic, exploded. America's seagoing commercial interests drew her unavoidably into the struggle between
England and France at a time when the courts were called upon to develop an
American commercial and maritime law. Coincident with the growth of maritime
13

Isodire Silver, The United States Supreme Court from Bushrod Washington to Roman Hruska,

COMMONWEAL XCII at 224 (1970), quoted in ANNIS, supra note 2, at 1.
14

See GEORGE HASKINS & HERBERT JOHNSON, FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL 1801-

1815 (1981).
15

See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 1815-1835 (1988).

16

See James R. Stoner, Jr., Heir Apparent: Bushrod Washington and FederalJustice in the Early

Republic, in SERIATIM: THE SUPREME COURT BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL 322-49 (1998).
The Supreme Court opinions are found in volumes 3 U.S. (3 Dal].) through 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) of the
SUPREME COURT REPORTS. Between 1826 and 1829, Richard Peters, Jr. edited and published most of
Washington's circuit opinions in four volumes. See B. WASHINGTON, REPORTS OF CASES DETERMINED IN
THE CIRcurr COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE THIRD CIRcurr, (Peters ed., 1826-1829). The circuit
opinions are also published in FEDERAL CASES, volumes 2 through 30. Citations of circuit opinions in this
Article are to FEDERAL CASES.
17
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interests, the westward migration produced a conflict between rules governing title
to real property and national commercial interests. Finally, selected cases involving
the slavery question and aspects of criminal law are particularly disclosive of
Justice Washington's humanity and personal philosophy. Together, these four
categories of cases give us a relatively clear picture of Justice Washington's
judicial philosophy and character and his historical significance and impact.
II. THE AGE OF DISCOVERY: 1781-1830
The Age of Discovery began with the American victory at Yorktown, one
of history's great turning points; fittingly, Justice Washington was there. A brief
window of French naval superiority and the mistakes of his superior officer had
placed Lord Cornwallis, commanding British forces in the southern colonies, in a
trap between the James and York Rivers. Here, over a period of weeks, French and
American artillery and relentless attacks on his lines had decimated Cornwallis's
forces, their supplies, and their will to fight. 18 On October 19, 1781, Cornwallis
surrendered.
Present in the Allied ranks that afternoon to witness the surrender was the
nephew of the American commander George Washington. Bushrod Washington
was a private soldier in Colonel John Mercer's Virginia dragoons.1 9 Small of
stature, with light brown hair and delicate features, he resembled his famous uncle
not at all. 20 But, like his uncle, he had proven his courage. Cornwallis had invaded
Virginia the previous May and Bushrod Washington, recently a student at the
College of William and Mary, had answered the call for volunteers.2' Young
Washington made the transition from student to soldier successfully. In his
memoirs, Light Horse Harry Lee recounts with approval the operations of Colonel
Mercer's corps in the weeks before Yorktown.22 When shadowing Cornwallis's
movements at the James River, near Greenspring in early July, Bushrod
Washington was one of "two intelligent young dragoons ...who had been sent to
the river with glasses, to attend to the passage of the enemy across it."' 23 Mercer's
cavalry bore the brunt of Cornwallis's counterattacks in the ensuing battle of
Greenspring. 24 On October 3, Mercer's corps was again in the thick of the action
against Lt. Col. Tarleton's legion near Yorktown. In a fierce fight, Mercer's troops
halted Tarleton's advance, then forced his retirement while nearly exhausting their

18

See ROBERT MIDDLEKAUFF, THE GLORIOUS CAUSE 569-70 (1972).

19

See ANNIS, supra note 2, at 31.

20

See HORACE BINNEY, BUSHROD WASHINGTON 6 (1858).

21

See ANNIS, supra note 2, at 31.

22

HENRY LEE, MEMOIRS OF THE WAR IN THE SOUTHERN DEPARTMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

414-

46(1869).
23

See id. at 433.

24

See id. at 435.
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own ammunition2 5
Although the war would go on for some months more, primarily as a naval
struggle between France and Britain in the West Indies, Yorktown ultimately
produced the fall of Lord North's government and the independence of the
American colonies.26 Shortly after Yorktown, Mercer's corps disbanded and
Bushrod went home intending to continue his study of law.27 He was destined for a
successful career as a lawyer and to become the lord of Mount Vernon and a Justice
of the United States Supreme Court. Appointed to the Court by President Adams in
1798, he would serve until his death in 1829, the year Andrew Jackson took office
as President. On the afternoon of Cornwallis's surrender, young Washington could
not possibly have foreseen the changes he would witness during his lifetime. At
Yorktown he stood on the threshold of a new age.
This new age, the period from the end of the American Revolution until
the first administration of President Andrew Jackson, was a remarkable era
presenting numerous challenges to the legal profession. A few facts illustrate the
magnitude of change and the significance of the challenge.
The Treaty of Paris officially ended the Revolutionary War in 1783 and
added over 541,000,000 acres of western land to the thin band of territory along the
Atlantic seaboard controlled by the original thirteen colonies. 28 Twenty years later
the Louisiana Purchase added 828,000 square miles, effectively doubling the land
area of the United States.29 When the Spanish cession of Florida was completed in
1819, the country had gained 46,000,000 acres more.30 The new nation therefore
had plenty of room in which to grow. Cheap western land beckoned to the
ambitious and the venturesome.
The remarkable territorial expansion of the United States was accompanied
by an astonishing growth in population. Official census figures from 1790 to 1830
reveal increases from decade to decade of well over thirty percent each.31 A
national population of 3,929,000 in 1790 grew to 12,866,000 in 1830.32 Population
growth proved a fitting complement to the ready availability of inexpensive
western land. Accompanying the overall growth in population, therefore, was a
shift in population from the Eastern states to the territory west of the Appalachian
Mountains. Cheap western lands gave the growing populace a place to go and a

PS

See U at 498.

26

See MIDDLEKAUFF, supra note 18, at 570. Lord Frederick North became head of the British

government in January 1770. He was forced to resign in March 1782, after military reverses at Yorktown and
in the West Indies. His successor, Lord Rockingham, immediately opened peace negotiations with the
Americans. See id. at 208, 571.
27
See ANNIS, supranote 2, at 33.
28

See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN HiSTORY 572 (Richard B. Morris & Jeffrey B. Morris eds., 7th

ed. 1996).
9

See id. at 150.

30

See id. at 572.

31

See id. at 632.

32

See id.
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way to prosper. Many veterans of the Revolutionary War were paid for their
service with tracts of land in the West. Countless others saw in western land
prospects for a new start and a better life.
In 1790, only one million people lived beyond the mountains.3 This grew
to 2,217,474 in 1820 and to nearly 3,700,000 in 1830.34 Between 1812 and 1821 six
new states were admitted to the Union and all experienced phenomenal population
growth.3 Illinois, for example, grew by 185% between the enumerations of 1820
and 1830.36 The growth of population and its flow westward brought with it all the
accoutrements of growth - the demand for goods and services as well as the
means to deliver them, finance them, and pay for them.
As the new nation moved West, it also expanded in other directions over
the oceans. At its inception, the United States was a maritime nation, wedded to the
sea and foreign commerce. Because of the great natural barrier consisting of the
Appalachian Mountains and its virtually impassible forests and streams, the West
Indies and the harbors of Europe seemed closer to the original colonies than the
western lands. Independence gave a renewed impetus to seaborne commerce. From
1790 to 1801 exports rose rapidly from twenty million to ninety-four million a
year.3 7 During the same period imports increased from twenty-three million to $110
million.3 8 The impact of the Napoleonic Wars and America's response caused
several periods of contraction between 1800 and 1815, but the general trend in
foreign commerce was upward. Exports peaked at $138.5 million in 1807, 3 and
remained steady at about seventy million a year from 1815 to 1830.4 The United
States ran foreign trade deficits throughout this period. 1
Henry Adams described the isolation of the western territories in 1800
which continued in spite of the post-Revolution flood of immigrants. "Nowhere did
eastern settlements touch the western," and "[a]t least one hundred miles of
mountainous country held the two regions everywhere apart.", 42 In the West, the
natural flow of trade was away from the eastern seaboard, down the Mississippi to
the Gulf of Mexico.4 3 This physical separation placed obvious strains on the
33

See I

HARRY J. CARMAN & HAROLD C. SYRErr,

A

HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

316

(1952).
34

See id.

35

See id.

36

See id.

37

See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 28, at 689.

38

See id.

39

See id.

40

See id. at 690.

41

See id.

42

HENRY ADAMS, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DURING THE ADMINISTRATION OF

THOMAS JEFFERSON 6 (Library of America ed., 1986).
43

See id.
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relationship of the two regions and it was, for a time, doubtful whether the West
could be held in the Union.
A great revolution in transportation ended the isolation of the two regions
and, coupled with a renaissance in innovation and technology, produced
unprecedented commercial activity and economic growth. As population and
internal trade increased, the demand for transportation facilities grew. The first
phase of the transportation revolution was "a remarkable period in improved road
building."44 The Philadelphia and Lancaster Turnpike set the standard. Designed to
connect the headwaters of the Potomac and Ohio Rivers, its sixty-two-mile course
was completed in 1794 at a cost of $465,000. 45 A huge financial success, its
shareholders were paid annual dividends as high as fifteen percent from tolls
collected. 46 Success of the Philadelphia-Lancaster Pike led to a furious period of
road construction. 47 The crown jewel of the age of turnpikes was the Cumberland
Pike or Old National Road, a paved thoroughfare connecting Cumberland,
Maryland, with the Ohio River at Wheeling.48 Eventually extending through the
Midwest to Illinois, the National Road provided a connection of east to west and
stimulated commerce and interest in internal improvements of all kinds.4 9 By 1821,
4,000 miles of new turnpikes had been completed.5 0
Construction of turnpikes led to a rapid increase in postal service. Federal
legislation in 1794 and 1814 produced expansion of mail service.51 In 1794 there
were only 5001 miles of post roads in operation; by 1829 this had increased to
104,521.2
Paralleling construction of the turnpikes was the construction of canals.
Miles of man-made watercourses connected the natural commercial waterways of
east and west. The financial success of the Erie Canal, connecting Lake Erie to the
Hudson River, set off a boom in canal construction.53 Built between 1817 and 1825,
the original Erie Canal was 363 miles long and cost over $7,000,000 to build.54 It
paid for itself within nine years, however, from tolls collected.55 By 1840, over

44

CARMAN & SYRETr, supra note 33, at 486.

45

See id.

46

See id.

47

See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supranote 28, at 572.

48

See id. at 420.

49

See CARMAN & SYRETr, supra note 33, at 467.

50

See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supranote 28, at 421.

51

See id. at 419.

52

See id.

53

See WHrrE, supranote 15, at 16.

54

See JAMES MCGREGOR BURNS, THE VINEYARD OF LIBERTY 303 (1982).

55

See CARMAN & SYRETr, supranote 33, at 475.
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3,000 miles of canals had been built at a cost of $125 million.5 6
Success of the canals and turnpikes greatly reduced land transportation
costs and made trans-Appalachian trade feasible. The regions were drawn together
57
by the resulting boom in commerce and its augmentation of the nation's wealth.
Stimulated by the transportation revolution and the commercial activity that went
with it, an era of business and manufacturing innovation ensued. Arkwright
machinery and the textile industry led the way.58 When the Napoleonic Wars
interrupted the flow of manufactured goods from Europe, Americans responded by
building their own mills. 59 New England saw the beginning of mass production and
Pittsburgh the inception of the mechanized iron industry. 60
Originally powered by falling water, American industry gradually turned
to steam. Steam-powered travel was but a short further step. Steam-driven boats
were successfully launched in 1787 by John Fitch in New Jersey and James
Rumsey on the Potomac at Shepherdstown, 6' but it was Robert Fulton, two decades
later, who built the first commercially practicable steamboat. 62 Growth of steam
transportation on the Great Lakes and inland waterways was swift and substantial.
In 1817, there were seventeen steamboats operating on western rivers; three years
later there were sixty-nine. 63
Commercial and industrial activity demanded the financial machinery to
facilitate itself. From 1801 to 1811 the number of state banks rose from thirty to
eighty-eight.64 The device of limited liability for business enterprise also grew.
Beginning with New York in 1811, states substituted general corporation laws for
the previous practice of seeking charters from the state legislature.6 There was no
national currency. Private bank notes were the principal medium of exchange,66 and
human ingenuity developed many methods of paying obligations and transferring
wealth. In the West, for example, land warrants circulated as a type of commercial
paper.
Growth and change challenged the law and the legal system. Developing a
legal system for the new nation was a monumental task, made more difficult by the
pace and magnitude of change. Justice Washington joined the Supreme Court just
as this process was gaining momentum. He was to play a key role as the Court
56

See BURNS, supra note 54, at 304-05.

57

See CARMAN & SYRETr, supra note 33, at 475.

58

See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supranote 28, at 707.

59

See BURNS, supra note 54, at 291.

60

See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 28, at 708.

61

See id. at 784-85.

62

Id. at 785.

63

See BURNS, supra note 54, at 300.

64

See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 28, at 729.

65

See id.

66

See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 236 (1973).
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confronted the issues of dynamic growth and the development of a commercial
economy.
I.A JUSTICE'S PREPARATION: 1762-1798
For early clues to Justice Washington's judicial philosophy, we look to his
education. Born in Westmoreland County, Virginia, on June 5, 1762,67 Bushrod
Washington was the eldest son of John Augustine Washington, next eldest brother
of George Washington.68 At an early age his father placed him with a private tutor
in the home of Richard Henry Lee.69 Lee's influence on him must have been slight,
however, for Lee was destined to become a leader of the anti-federalist party in
Virginia,7 in sharp contrast to Bushrod's consistent federalist sympathies. Later,
Bushrod was privately tutored at home.7' Because a classical education was
necessary for admission to William and Mary, his instruction probably included
Greek and Latin. 2

In 1778, shortly before his sixteenth birthday, Bushrod Washington
graduated from the College of William and Mary. 3 The following year one of the
early milestones in American legal education was passed - George Wythe was
appointed to the first chair of law in an American college 4 Wythe's appointment
drew many scholars to William and Mary, among them Bushrod Washington, who
returned to the school in 1780.! 5 Wythe had been a signer of the Declaration of
Independence and a chancery judge in Virginia7 6 Moreover, he was "perhaps the
foremost classical scholar in the state." 7 Later, as a federalist delegate to the
Virginia Ratification Convention, Wythe played a key role in securing approval of
the Constitution.78 Wythe used English law texts and constructed a curriculum
which included regular lectures on various subjects of law and a series of moot

67

See Bushrod C. Washington, The Late Mr. Justice Bushrod Washington, IX No. 8 THE GREEN

BAG 329 (1897).
68

See Obituary, 28 U.S. (3 Peters) vii (1804).

69

See HAMPrON L. CARSON, THE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES WITH

188-89 (1891).
See JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., Antecedents-and Beginnings to 1801 in 1 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME

BIOGRAPHIES OF ALL THE CHIEF AND ASSOCIATE JUSTICES

70

COURT OFTHE UNITED STATES 287-90 (Paul A. Freund, ed. 1971).
71

See Obituary, 28 U.S. (3 Peters) vii (1804).

72

See ANNIS, supra note 2, at 21.

73

See id. at 26.

74

See FRIEDMAN, supra note 66, at 120.

75

See ANNIS, supra note 2, at 26.

76

See id.

77

FRIEDMAN, supranote 66, at 120.
See GOEBEL, supra note 70, at 390.

78
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courts.7" The "most respectable citizens" were recruited as audiences for the moot
court proceedings over which Wythe and other professors sat as judges. 80 There
was also a mock legislature, with Wythe presiding as Speaker, in which the law
students drafted bills, debated, and went through all the procedures of a
legislature. 81 Washington studied under Wythe at William and Mary for at least
three months.82 While studying under Wythe, Washington formed a friendship with
John Marshall, a fellow student several years his senior, that would last a lifetime.'
In May of 1780, Marshall and Washington were both initiated into the Society of
Phi Beta Kappa at William and Mary. 4 It is not clear when Washington left the
college; his name no longer appeared on the active role of Phi Beta Kappa at its
fourth anniversary celebration held on December 5, 1780.85
After attending George Wythe's lectures at William and Mary, John
Marshall obtained a law license and went into private practice.8 6 Washington
resolved to continue the study of law.87 Not yet twenty years of age, he may have
considered himself too young to embark on a legal career.88
In Bushrod's plans to continue his legal education, we see early evidence
of a special relationship with his uncle. As mentioned above, Bushrod was the
eldest son of George Washington's eldest brother.89 It was natural under the mores
of the day for him to be the object of the first President's interest and largesse.9"
But the relationship went far beyond this.9 ' Bushrod corresponded regularly with
his uncle, soliciting and following his advice, and was a frequent guest at Mount
Vernon.92 From the headquarters of the Continental Army in March of 1782,
General Washington wrote to James Wilson, asking him to take his nephew into his
law office as an apprentice.93 Wilson, a Scottish immigrant and ardent proponent of
79

See ANNIS, supra note 2, at 26.

80

1 BEVERIDGE, supra note 12, at 158.

81

See id.

82

See LAWRENCE B. CUSTER, Bushrod Washington and John Marshall: A Preliminary Inquiry, 4

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY 38 (1960).
83

See id. at 36.

B4

See id.

85

See ANNIS, supra note 2, at 29.

86

See 1 BEVERIDGE, supra note 12, at 161.

87

See CUSTER, supra note 82, at 37.

88

See id.

89

See ANNIS, supra note 2, at 36.

90

See id.

91

See BINNEY, supra note 20, at 7.

92

See id.

93

See CHARLES PAGE SMITH, JAMES WILSON, FOUNDING FATHER 170 (1956).
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American independence, had built a thriving practice in Philadelphia 4 and a
reputation as one of America's premier lawyers. He wrote to General Washington
that he would accept his nephew - at a fee of one hundred guineas. 96 The high fee
may have been Wilson's method of discouraging the arrangement without saying
no to the General.97 If so, his strategy did not work; Washington promptly sent
Wilson a promissory note for the fee and recommended his nephew to Wilson, not
only as a student, but also as a friend.98
General Washington worried that his nephew might fall victim to the
worldly temptations of the city upon his move to Philadelphia. 9 In January he
wrote to Bushrod advising him to adopt eminence in the legal profession, not mere
study of the law, as his object.' ° Seek honor and profit, the General advised,
adding that "dissipation is incompatible with both."' 0 ' Jared Sparks, an early
collector of George Washington's papers, called this "one of the wisest and
discreetest letters ever written by father to son" and "worthy to be recorded in
letters of gold."' 0 2 The General had no cause for worry; his nephew embarked on a
course of study so arduous that it impaired his sight, eventually causing, in 1797,
the loss of an eye."
Bushrod's sojourn in Philadelphia was not without difficulty. His father,
John Augustine Washington, had agreed to pay his son's living expenses if the
General could discharge Wilson's fee. 04 John Augustine Washington was landed
and socially prominent, but he must have been short of ready cash. 0 5 In 1782, a
hemp crop failed and he was unable to pay his son's living expenses.0 6 At the same
time he advised his son not to draw on letters of credit he carried written by his
uncle. 10 7 As a result, Bushrod was forced to change his lodgings, his landlord
threatening to detain his personal effects for back rent.'0 8 Only a personal loan from
94

See id. at 128.
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a friend got him through the crisis.10 9 These dark days had a positive ending,
however, for Bushrod was taken in by the Wilsons."1 °
James Wilson had immigrated to Philadelphia after struggling as an
impecunious "terner," a student of the bottom social rank, at St. Andrews
University.111 With the financial assistance of a cousin, he had studied law under
John Dickinson in Philadelphia and gained admission to the bar.1 2 Thus, Wilson
had a common-law legal education, even though he came from Scotland, a civil law
jurisdiction. He quickly became a prominent and successful lawyer and a leader in
the movement for American independence. 13 Wilson had served as a Pennsylvania
delegate to both the Continental Congress, which issued the Declaration of
Independence, and the convention which framed the Constitution.1 14 He would be
1 15
appointed by President Washington to the first Supreme Court.
Bushrod Washington could hardly have had a better mentor. Wilson17
possessed a large and varied library 16 and a circle of close and congenial friends.
The relationship between Wilson and his young apprentice ripened into a personal
friendship which would last their lifetimes.11 8 Long after Wilson's death, William
Johnson asserted in his biography of Nathaniel Greene that Wilson had been a
member of the "cabal opposed to General Washington" during the Revolution.119
Bushrod, Johnson's colleague on the Supreme Court by that time, joined Wilson's
son in setting the record straight. 120 Johnson,
a stubborn man who hated to admit it
121
when wrong, issued a public apology.
It is impossible to know exactly what Wilson taught Bushrod Washington.
We find Wilson's legal philosophy expressed in law lectures delivered at the
College of Philadelphia beginning in 1789 and his opinions as a Justice of the
United States Supreme Court. Both occurred long after Washington was his student
2
and we cannot be sure the theories expressed there were fully developed in 1782.1
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In general, Wilson viewed the universe as governed by immutable rules.' 23
Among these rules were the precepts of natural law ordained by God to govern the
conduct of men.' 2 4 A function of law was to discover and implement these
immutable rules, and the study of history and metaphysics was the key to discovery
of the rules.'25 Wilson questioned Blackstone's definition of law as the command of
a sovereign. 28 He believed legitimate127authority to flow upward from the will of the
people, not downward from the king.
To Wilson, the people's will as expressed in the Constitution was different
from their will as expressed in legislative enactments. Legislatures were subject to
capture by factions representing narrow, selfish interests. Americans of Wilson's
day had come to distrust the state legislatures which seemed to be constantly
changing the rules. In Chisholm v. Georgia,128 Wilson developed the premise that
all political power was derived from the people who had expressed their will in the
Constitution. 129 Wilson unquestionably believed judicial review to be the
mechanism whereby the people's will as expressed in the Constitution would be
protected from legislative interference. 130 In the debates at the constitutional
convention he took the position that, if Congress131exceeded the powers vested in it,
the courts would declare its action null and void.
Wilson's themes reemerge in the opinions of Bushrod Washington. The
concept that law is a set of immutable rules which can be "discovered" through
study, the notion that a written constitution expresses the sovereign will of the
people, and the doctrine of judicial review are all there. Although we do not know
exactly what Wilson taught Washington, it is apparent his influence was
significant.
In the spring of 1784 Bushrod Washington returned to Virginia and was
admitted to the bar.13 2 In June he took a month and accompanied his uncle on a tour
of the President's western lands undertaken to collect rents, remove trespassers, and
consider prospects for further speculation.133 On this trip Bushrod may have gained
an understanding of the chaotic state of western land titles which would influence
his decisions three decades later.
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Bushrod practiced law for several years in his native Westmoreland
County, which he represented in the Virginia General Assembly and in the
convention that ratified the federal Constitution.' 34 At the Virginia Convention, the
federalist party led by Governor Edmund Randolph, James Madison, and John
Marshall confronted the opponents of ratification, including George Mason and
Patrick Henry.1 35 The supporters of the new Constitution had devised their strategy
in advance and presented a united front. 136 Their opponents waged a disorganized,
piecemeal attack. 137 Moreover, one of the anti-federalists' best advocates,
Bushrod's old benefactor Richard Henry Lee, was absent due to ill health.'31 In the
end, Madison's calm reasoning carried the day over Henry's emotional attacks.
Bushrod, firmly in the federalist camp, was present for each vote, but apparently
did not speak on the floor during the debates.139 The contrasting styles of Madison
and Henry must surely have made an impression on the young delegate.
Bushrod's law practice in Westmoreland County apparently fell short of
expectations. 140 He also found practicing law and attending to the plantation he had
inherited on his father's death to be in irreconcilable conflict. 14' He wrote to his
uncle in November, 1788, that "it is necessary to relinquish my farm or my
profession." 142 That winter
he selected law over agriculture, sold the farm, and
143
moved to Alexandria.
In the summer of 1789, Bushrod made an effort to secure appointment as
United States Attorney for Virginia in the new national government.' 44 He was
rebuffed by his uncle, now President, who feared a charge of nepotism. 145 The
Alexandria practice proved unsuccessful and Bushrod determined to move again,
this time to Richmond. 46 It is not clear just when the move to Richmond occurred.
One writer places it in 1792 based on reports of cases argued in the Supreme Court
of Appeals of Virginia published some years later by Washington; these reports
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147
begin with cases decided in that year.
In Richmond, the successful law practice, which had previously eluded
Washington, was finally his. 148 Immersion in the law was complete. A relative
reported years later that "he continued a deep student of law, so absorbing and
assimilating it into his nature that it became his possession."' 149 Washington appears
to have had few interests beyond his profession except for a life-long love of music
and the popular novels of the day which he read aloud to his wife in the
evenings.' 50
Washington often argued in the Court of Appeals of Virginia at Richmond
and he attended that court even when not counsel in the cases under consideration.
He took copious notes of the proceedings for his own use, later publishing them as
two volumes of Virginia Reports. During this period Washington appeared in
numerous cases with John Marshall, often as adversaries, but occasionally as cocounsel.'5 1 Among his clients was Thomas Jefferson, who asked Washington to

represent him in a chancery suit in 1795.152

In the late summer of 1798, George Washington, now retired from the
White House to Mount Vernon, became alarmed about the prospects of the
Federalist Party in the approaching congressional elections .5 A weak Federalist
candidate for Congress was willing to withdraw in favor of a stronger if one could
be found.154 George Washington, eager to find such a candidate for his party,
summoned his nephew and John Marshall to Mount Vernon. 155 Senator Beveridge,
in his biography of Marshall, tells what happened when the two friends, traveling
together, arrived at Mt. Vernon:
For convenience in traveling, they had put their clothing in the
same pair of saddle-bags. They arrived in heavy rain and were
'drenched to the skin.' Unlocking the saddle-bags, the first article
they took out was a black bottle of whiskey. With great hilarity
each charged this to be the property of the other. Then came a
thick twist of tobacco, some corn bread, and finally the worn
apparel of wagoners; at some tavern on the way their saddle-bags
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had become exchanged for those of drivers. 56
Another version of the story has a servant, placed in charge of a
portmanteau containing their clothes, mistakenly exchanging it for a similar one
belonging to a Scottish pedlar. 157 When the portmanteau was opened it contained,
not clothes, but "cakes of Windsor soap and fancy articles of all kinds."'"" In both
versions of the story, George Washington is said to have roared with laughter at the
misfortune of his guests.
Under intense pressure from the first President, Marshall and Bushrod
Washington agreed to participate in the upcoming election. Shortly thereafter,
however, word came that Bushrod's mentor, James Wilson, had died, creating a
vacancy on the Supreme Court.
Five names were prominently mentioned for the appointment: Jacob Rush,
Samuel Sitgreaves, and Richard Peters of Pennsylvania; and John Marshall and
Bushrod Washington of Virginia.' 59 Rush appeared to be the best qualified. Born in
1747, he was the eldest and most experienced of the candidates. 160 He also
appeared to be the best educated, having graduated from Princeton in 1765 and
London's Middle Temple in 177 1.161 Rush also had prior judicial experience as a
Judge of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. 6 2 He withdrew his name, however,
63
perhaps discouraged by the burden of travel the appointment would entail.'
Sitgreaves was at the other extreme and was eliminated as too inexperienced." 4
Peters indicated that he would decline the appointment because of an inadequate
salary and the onerous duties of the office.' 65 These problems with the
Pennsylvania candidates proved not to be disconcerting to Adams. The President
preferred someone from Virginia; that state had remained unrepresented on the
court since Justice John Blair's resignation in 1795.'6 Marshall and Washington
proved to be President Adams' first and second choices for the position. 67 Now
committed to running for Congress, Marshall declined the appointment in favor of
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his friend. 168 Washington also received the strong support of Attorney General
Charles Lee, 16 9 an old friend of the Washington family and brother to Light Horse
Harry Lee,17 ° who had been favorably impressed with Bushrod's military service in
the Revolution. As an experienced practitioner of law in Virginia, 171 Attorney
General Lee was no doubt familiar with the legal talents and temperament of
Bushrod Washington. Though only thirty-six years old, Washington had already
developed a reputation as a profound lawyer. 72
With the approval of his uncle, Bushrod withdrew from the congressional
race and accepted the appointment.17 3 He was the first appointee of President
Adams to the Supreme Court, the eleventh Justice to serve on the Court and was
the youngest appointed to that time.174
IV. PRINCIPAL OPINIONS OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON:

1799-1829

The federal judicial system in 1798, when Bushrod Washington became a
Supreme Court Justice, was remarkably different from that of today. Three types of
courts had been established by the Judiciary Act of 1789 - the Supreme Court,
district courts, and circuit courts.175 Judges were provided for the Supreme Court
and the district courts, but not for the circuit courts. 176 Each state had at least one
district court. Originally there were three circuit courts. The circuit courts were
made up of the district judge of the district in which the circuit court sat and two
justices of the Supreme Court. 177 In 1793, the Judiciary Act was amended to require
that only one justice attend each session of the circuit court. 178 The Supreme Court
justices therefore had to ride circuit - an onerous physical burden in those days. 179
The number of circuits was frequently expanded, however, and additional justices
were appointed, somewhat reducing the burden of circuit-riding. 180
Professor Wright summarizes the jurisdiction of the early courts as
follows:
168
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The district courts were entirely courts of original jurisdiction,
authorized to entertain admiralty cases, minor criminal cases, and
some other rather limited classes of cases. The circuit courts had
both original and appellate jurisdiction. They were the court of
original jurisdiction in diversity cases, most criminal cases, and
larger cases to which the United States was a party. They had
appellate jurisdiction over the district courts in civil cases where
the amount in controversy exceeded $50 and in admiralty cases
where the amount in controversy exceeded $300. The Supreme
Court had some original jurisdiction, as the constitution provided,
and had appellate jurisdiction over the circuit courts in civil cases
where the amount in controversy exceeded $2,000, and over the
state courts in cases raising a federal question. There was no
review in the Supreme Court of federal criminal cases. 81
For most of his career on the federal bench, Justice Washington was
assigned to a circuit which included Pennsylvania and New Jersey. He held court in
Philadelphia and Trenton, often sitting with Richard Peters, United States District
Judge for the District of Pennsylvania. Reports of the early cases reveal that
Washington and Peters sat together, not only in appellate cases, but also at trial. In
jury trials, both would charge the jury, and their instructions were occasionally
inconsistent. In fact, the practice of using multiple judges in jury trials was
common throughout the country. "The circuit courts were courts of great power
and dignity, and at an early time in our history brought home to the people of every
state a sense2 of national judicial power through the presence of the Supreme Court
8
Justices."1
After an initial tour of duty on the Southern Circuit, Washington was
assigned in 1803 to the circuit made up of Pennsylvania and New Jersey" where
he remained for the balance of his judicial career.'m
Washington probably welcomed the opportunity to return regularly to
Philadelphia where he had been a law student years before. He apparently did not
immediately make a mark, however, because of his unimposing appearance and his
self-effacing personality. Horace Binney, one of the leading members of the
Philadelphia bar, 185 described his first encounter with Bushrod Washington as
follows:
As I came in one day to dinner at my lodging-house, in North
Third Street, I perceived sitting in the parlor a new comer, of
about the common height, of slight figure, sallow complexion, and
181
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straight brown hair, the features of his face generally small, one of
his eyes apparently sightless, and the other having more than the
fire of an ordinary pair. His chin was nearly or quite beardless,
and it was to this, rather than to his other traits, that he owed the
expression there was about him, of being an old young man, or a
young old man-it was difficult at first to tell which-an
expression that to some degree continued till his death. This was
BUSHROD WASHINGTON, a nephew and to some extent the
'ereve of General Washington, and the son of John Augustine
Washington, General Washington's younger brother. Judge
Washington had just arrived and taken lodgings at the same house.
I soon found that he was easy in his manners, and affable,
unaffected, unpretending, and as far as possible from stateliness. I
could hardly
believe that he was a Judge of the highest Court in
186
the land.
Bushrod Washington authored eighty-one separate opinions as a Supreme
Court Justice which are reported in volumes 3 Dallas through 2 Peters of the
Supreme Court Reports. Between 1826 and 1829 Richard Peters, Jr., the son of
Washington's colleague on the federal bench, published Washington's circuit court
decisions. These cases, over 500 in number, were compiled principally from,
Washington's own notes.' 87 The practice on circuit was apparently to deliver the
opinions orally from rough notes. Many of the circuit opinions are summaries of
instructions in jury trials. These are often no more than cursory outlines of charges
which must have been much longer when actually delivered. There are, however,
many opinions which contain insights into Washington's judicial principles and
decisional processes. When these are combined with the Supreme Court opinions, a
reasonably clear impression of Washington the justice emerges. As noted above, I
have selected cases in four categories which are representative of Washington's
work and the way he approached the compelling legal issues of his day. Discussion
of these cases follows.
A.

ConstitutionalLitigation

Invariably, new nations are confronted with "the stress of national selfdefinition."' 88 The United States was no exception. Competing notions of political
power, economic theory, and the role of the military divided the country.
Federalists wanted a strong national government, a commercial society, and a
powerful army and navy. Conversely, the Republicans preferred power diffused to
the states, an agrarian economy, a weak army and no sea-going navy at all. In the
ongoing struggle between Britain and France, Americans tended to choose sides
along party lines. Republicans, still harboring resentment against Britain for the
186
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Revolutionary War, and infatuated with the stated principles of the French
Revolution, sided with France. Eschewing all things British, they secured in some
states passage of legislation forbidding citation of English authorities in their
courts.18 9 Among the Federalists, however, Anglophilia remained strong as did fear
of the French Revolution and "mob rule."
Constitutional cases decided during Justice Washington's tenure on the
Supreme Court arose in large part from this struggle between competing ideologies.
At first, the Federalists had the upper hand. With the exception of 1793-95, when
the Republicans held a brief majority in the House of Representatives,' 90 the
Federalists dominated all three branches of the national government before 1801.
State resistance to the federal government, which later came to be identified with
the defense of slavery and the movement for Southern independence, was not, at
first, confined to a single region. Republican opposition in Pennsylvania, for
example, was asserted on several fronts in what has been called the "Pennsylvania
Rebellion."' 9'
Judges, to their peril as it turned out, were drawn into this struggle.
Washington, as the Circuit Justice sitting in Philadelphia, found himself at the
center of the storm. Washington brought to the controversy a decidedly Federalist
concept of the role of the courts. His seriatim opinion in the early case of Cooper v.
Telfair 92 is revealing. The case was a diversity action to collect a debt. The
defendant contended that Cooper, the plaintiff, was barred from pursuing the case
by a Georgia statute attainting those who had adhered to the British side during the
Revolution; Cooper having taken up arms with the British troops. Cooper argued
that the statute was void under the Georgia Constitution. In a very short seriatim
opinion, Washington refused to hold the statute unconstitutional because he found
no express constitutional provision to apply. "The presumption, indeed," he said,
"must always be in favor of the validity of laws, if the contrary is not clearly
demonstrated."' 193 Washington's position is clear - the Court has the power to
declare legislation unconstitutional, but must do so only when the case is relatively
free from doubt. This is essentially the position developed by Alexander Hamilton
in Federalist No. 78.194 The Constitution is fundamental law representing the
sovereign will of the people; as such, it takes precedence over inconsistent actions
of the legislature. The Court, as the representative of the people, is to strike down
legislation, however, only when there is an "irreconcilable variance between the
two.' ' 195 One writer has argued that, although the early judges generally accepted
the doctrine of judicial review, they knew it had to be exercised sparingly.
189
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Otherwise, their authority would collapse. 96 This theory of judicial review, which
Professor Bickel referred to as "the rule of the clear mistake,"19' was the generally
accepted notion of the doctrine during the first one hundred years of the republic. 98
Many Federalist judges did not exercise the caution called for by the
Federalist theory of judicial review. As the Republicans gained strength, the bench,
populated with appointees of Presidents Washington and Adams, struck back.
Appalled by the prospect of a Republican takeover, they used their positions to
promote Federalist principles. 99 The extreme example was Justice Samuel Chase
who decorated his jury instructions with long attacks on Republican doctrine, and
who left the bench to campaign actively for Federalist candidates in elections.200
Federalist judges openly adopted legal constructions which would serve to expand
federal power. One such doctrine was the concept that common law crimes could
be prosecuted in federal court in the absence of enabling legislation by Congress.
Fear of judicial activism motivated opposition to the doctrine of federal
common law crimes. Losers in political battles were afraid they would be
prosecuted by United States Attorneys, and sentenced by judges, appointed by the
winners. Using the doctrine of common law crimes, creative prosecutors and
judges could find ways to get even with their political enemies.
An incident in 1799 involving Alexander Martin, firebrand editor of the
Republican Baltimore American, illustrates the political controversy of the day
which had spilled over into the federal courts. Martin reported in his November 8
edition of that year:
Yesterday the Federal District Court was opened in this city.
Judge Washington addressed the Jury, and I am told he exceeded
Brooks in stupidity and Harper in malignity. The chief object of
his speech appeared to be aimed against the republicans; he
declared in the course of his spouting that "he who did not
support the present administration,2 1ought to be deprived of the
privileges of an American citizen."
Two days later Martin begrudgingly printed a retraction, admitting he had
not been present and asserting that his remarks about Washington "were hastily

196

See William R. Casto, James Iredell and the American Origins of Judicial Review, 27 CONN. L.

REV. 329, 331 (1995).
197

ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 35 (1962).

198

See James B. Thayer, The Originand Scope of the American Doctrine of ConstitutionalLaw, VII

No. 3 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1893).
199

See HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 217.

200

See id.

201

3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1789-1800 at 399 (Maeva

Marcus ed., 1985). "Brooks" and "Harper" were federalist members of Congress from New York and South
Carolina, respectively. Id Martin was confused about the court - it was the circuit, not the district, court.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2000

21

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 102, Iss. 4 [2000], Art. 4
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 102:735

sketched from hearsay., 20 2 Martin had before him the example of Justice Chase,
who was from Maryland, and he may have assumed Washington would deliver a
charge to the grand jury similar to those characteristic of Chase. At any rate, he
had to take back his remarks, attributing them to "misinformation, and not to any
intentional wish to injure the feelings of the judge or his friends, or bestow
undeserved censure....,

2 03

In contrast to other judges and justices, Washington did not engage in
partisan activity from the bench. He did, however, campaign openly for Federalist
Charles Coatsworth Pinckney, Hamilton's candidate for President in 1800.204 (One
of the things which cost President Adams re-election in 1800 was his break with
Hamilton and the ensuing split in Federalist ranks; in supporting Pinckney,
Washington opposed the President who had appointed him to the Supreme Court.)
Washington's opinions sometimes reveal Federalist dogma, such as the notion of
common law crimes. In an 1804 prosecution for perjury allegedly committed in a
bankruptcy proceeding, 2 5 he charged the jury: "Every offense for which a man is
indicted, must be laid against some law, and it must be shown to come within
it.
' 206
Such law may be the general unwritten or common law, or the statute law.
The election of 1800 was the first "realignment election" in American
20 7
history. The Republicans gained the presidency and both houses of Congress.
The judiciary, however, remained firmly in control of Federalist judges with
lifetime tenure. Parallel situations existed in some states, such as Pennsylvania,
where Federalist judges blocked Republican legislative and executive initiatives.
The Republicans, believing the will of the people to be on their side,
moved promptly to oust the Federalist judges by impeachment. At the national
level, they succeeded in removing U.S. District Judge John Pickering, and in
bringing Justice Chase to trial in the Senate.20 8 In Pennsylvania, Judge Alexander
Addison was impeached by the House of Representatives and, on January 26, 1803,
convicted by the state Senate and removed from office. 0 9 Other Pennsylvania
judges were brought to trial in January, 1805, but the effort to convict them
narrowly failed in the state Senate.210
Further impeachments were planned. The Republicans were firmly
resolved to complete their revolution by replacing the Federalist judges with friends
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of the new administration. 2" United States District Judge Richard Peters, who
regularly sat with Washington on circuit, was one of the targets.212 The Federalist
judges were shaken. Chief Justice Marshall himself, called to testify in the trial of
Chase, appeared to eye-witnesses to be frightened.213 Judge Peters was intimidated.
Washington was certainly a potential target, and he revealed his apprehension in a
sympathetic letter to Chase.21 a Henry Adams, in a cryptic reference, observes that
'the punishment of Thomas Passmore for contempt was to be a ground for
impeachment of the Supreme Court judges of Pennsylvania. 2 5 A second report of'
the case of Anonymous referred to above, in which Washington had adopted the
common law of crimes, shows the defendant to have been one Thomas
Passmore.216 The common law crimes doctrine was anathema to Republicans. Had
Passmore been convicted under instructions by Washington and Peters that perjury
was a common law crime, the Republicans might have had their ground for
impeachment. Washington escaped from the trap by also charging the jury that
congressional repeal of the bankruptcy law providing for the proceeding in which
27
Passmore had allegedly perjured himself was an absolute bar to the prosecution.
This result is difficult to understand, apart from the impeachment threat. Passmore
was charged with lying under oath in a federal bankruptcy proceeding; if perjury
were a crime at common law, it is hard to see how later repeal of the bankruptcy act
could save him. Washington's charge, therefore, may have been designed to give
lip service to the doctrine of common law crimes while insuring, at the same time,
that Passmore would be acquitted.
Peters had a reputation for caution; 218 it is not surprising that he avoided
confrontation with the Republicans. If, on the other hand, Washington had dodged
the impeachment bullet in Passmore by compromising his instructions, his lack of
courage was totally uncharacteristic. Horace Binney, of the Philadelphia bar,
described Washington's normal demeanor: "[H]e was as cool, self-possessed and
efficient at a moment of high excitement at the Bar, or in the people, as if the
nerves of fear had been taken out of his brain by the roots. ' 219 Similarly, his
obituary in the Supreme Court Reports asserts: "[T]he fear of man never fell upon
him; it never entered into his thoughts, much less was it seen in his actions. ' 22°
211
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The greatest example of Washington's courage under fire occurred in
United States v. Bright.221 The case arose out of the notorious "Olmstead affair,"
one of the federal-state conflicts which together made up the "Pennsylvania
Rebellion."' ' - The Olmstead controversy, also referred to as the case of the Sloop
Active, had a long and convoluted history. 2 Gideon Olmstead, a sailor from
Connecticut, was captured by the British during the Revolutionary War, impressed
into the British Navy, and forced to serve on board the sloop Active.2 24 Olmstead
and other American members of the crew seized control of the Active and sailed
for New Jersey, the nearest friendly shore. Off New Jersey, the Active was captured
by the Convention, a sloop-of-war in service of the State of Pennsylvania. A libel
was filed in the Pennsylvania Court of Admiralty, a state admiralty court, by the
master of the Convention who claimed the Active as a prize. Olmstead and his
compatriots filed a claim in the suit contending the Active was their prize. A jury
returned a verdict giving one-quarter of the Active's value to Olmstead and his
associates and the remaining three-quarters to the other claimants. An appeal was
taken to a federal court established by the Continental Congress to consider appeals
from state admiralty courts. That court reversed the state court award and held
Olmstead and his associates entitled to the full value of the vessel. The Active was
sold, but the marshal paid the money into the state admiralty court and the funds
were eventually handed over to David Rittenhouse, State Treasurer of
Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania refused to relinquish its share of the award, about
11,500 pounds, to Olmstead.
There followed a long struggle between Pennsylvania and the federal
government over whose courts were entitled to resolve the matter. Olmstead v. The
Active225 was tried before Judge Peters in December 1802. The Governor of
Pennsylvania refused to obey Peters' judgment in favor of Olmstead. Republican
newspapers supported the state in its defiance of federal authority. 2 6 Judge Peters,
perhaps fearing impeachment, declined to enforce his judgment until ordered to do
so by the United States Supreme Court. 2 7 Pennsylvania's defiance of the ensuing
writ led to an armed face-off between United States Marshals and the Pennsylvania
militia commanded by Brigadier General Michael Bright. Bright drew up his troops
around the house of Rittenhouse's executrixes who had become reluctant
stakeholders in the matter. The stand-off melted away when some members of the
221
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militia, threatened with federal treason charges, refused to serve, and others were
2 8
drafted by the marshals into a posse comitatus to help them execute Peters' writ.
A federal grand jury subsequently indicted Bright and other officers of the
Pennsylvania militia for resisting the laws of the United States. The case came on
for trial before Washington in an atmosphere of high public agitation.22 9 Bright's
defense posed three legal issues. He first contended that Judge Peters' writ was
void because a federal court had no power to reverse the decision of a state
admiralty court.230 Next, he argued that, because Pennsylvania claimed an interest
in the subject of the underlying dispute, the case was one to which the state was a
party and therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment.23 1 Lastly, he claimed
immunity from prosecution because he was "just following orders" - here the
directions of the Governor.232 Washington swept aside all three points in his charge
to the jury.m The first issue had been settled by the Supreme Court in Penhallowv.
Doane's Administrators,2 which upheld the power of federal appeals courts to
review decisions of state admiralty courts even in cases where the judgments were
based on jury verdicts. Washington's instructions to the jury on this point contain
an eloquent tribute to the value of precedent:
Miserable, indeed, must be the condition of that community where
the law is unsettled, and, decisions upon the very point are
disregarded, when they come again, directly or incidentally, into
discussion. In such a state of things good men have nothing to
hope, and bad men nothing to fear. There is no standard by which
the rights of property, and the most estimable privileges to which
the citizens are entitled, can be regulated. All is doubt and
uncertainty until the judge has pronounced the law on the
particular case before him; but which carries with it no authority
as to a similar case between other parties.
On the second point, Washington explained that the State of Pennsylvania
was not a named party to the case and, even if it had been party to the underlying
suit (which it had not), that case was not under review in the present action.
Additionally, the admiralty appeals court had, by giving the entire interest in the
property to Olmstead and his associates, extinguished any state claim.
228
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On the final point, Washington delivered a ringing defense of federal
supremacy. Bright, he said, was "bound by a paramount duty to the government of
the Union" 236 and should not have obeyed the Governor's unlawful mandate. What
if the state had court-martialed him for refusing the Governor's order? Then,
Washington said, he "ought to have been acquitted, upon the ground that the orders
themselves were unlawful and
237 void, and we ought, of course, to suppose that [he]
would have been acquitted.,
The facts were not in dispute and, as a result, Washington's charge to the
jury was tantamount to directing a verdict of guilty. But feelings against the federal
government remained high, even among the jurors, and they hesitated. The jury
deliberated for three days, unable to agree.238 When two of them complained they
were ill, Washington sent them a doctor.239 Finally, they returned a special verdict,
concluding that the defendants had knowingly obstructed the marshals, but had
done so under the orders of the constituted authorities of the State of
Pennsylvania. 240 If the court is of the opinion that the law upon such facts is for the
United States, said the jury, the defendants are guilty; but if the law is for the
defendants, they are not guilty. 241
Joseph Hopkinson, who would succeed Peters as District Judge, was
present and he told what happened next:
[T]he court sitting in the upstairs room of the United States circuit
court, Philadelphia, the room being too small for the vast
concourse of anxious auditors, many of whom came to witness, as
they expected, Judge Washington's discomfiture, the Judge,
turning to the crier, said to him in the mildest and most composed
way, "Adjourn the court, to meet tomorrow in the room on the
ground floor of this building. This is an important case, the
citizens manifest great interest in the result, and it is right that they
should be allowed, without too much inconvenience, to witness
the administration of the justice of the country, to which all men,
great and small, are alike bound to submit. 242
The next day, in a larger room and before a great crowd, Washington
adjudged the defendants guilty.2 43 He sentenced Bright to three months in jail and a
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$200 fine; the other defendants received lesser punishment.244 President Madison,
who had supported the federal marshals throughout, immediately pardoned the
defendants and the crisis was over.245 Many believed Washington would not dare to
find the defendants guilty. But, said Hopkinson, such people "did not know
246 him"
and "were incapable of appreciating his rare moral and judicial qualities."
Bushrod Washington was a silent partner of John Marshall in most of the
great constitutional decisions handed down during his tenure on the Supreme
Court. William Johnson, President Jefferson's first appointee to the Court,
complained in a letter to Jefferson that Marshall and Washington were so close they
were "commonly estimated as one judge." 247 The relationship was indeed
exceptional. They had known each other since college and had been allies in many
political wars before they became judges. Marshall was the person chosen by
Bushrod to write the definitive biography of his famous uncle.248 Although
Marshall recused himself from Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,249 there is evidence to
suggest he drafted the petition for a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Appeals
of Virginia and arranged for Washington to sign it. 250 When Marshall wrote a series
of anonymous letters defending the decision in McCulloch v. Maryland,2 51 it was
2 52
Washington who arranged for their publication in a Philadelphia newspaper.
Marshall's younger son, James, was disciplined for breaking a window and
displaying an improper attitude in chapel services at Harvard.m Marshall wrote to
Washington seeking his help in placing James with a Philadelphia investment
house. Apparently Washington came through for his friend - Harvard records
indicate that, on May 2, 1815, James Keith Marshall withdrew to join the
Philadelphia firm of Willis & Francis.2 4 Marshall's dependence on Washington
embraced less serious matters as well. Washington's connections with the world of
commerce in Philadelphia enabled Marshall to keep his wine cellar in Richmond
well stocked.255 In 1810, Washington shipped a "half pipe" of Madeira to Marshall
at the Chief Justice's request - approximately 63 gallons of fortified wine.256
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The suggestion that Washington was dominated by Marshall's stronger
personality and intellect, however, is simply incorrect. The cases, particularly
Washington's circuit opinions appealed to the Supreme Court, demonstrate that
Washington made up his own mind and did not always agree with Marshall. The
frequency of their agreement is attributable to the similarity of their backgrounds
and their consistent political philosophies. It was also a practice of the Marshall57
Court to create the appearance of unanimity when it did not in fact exist.2
Washington completely agreed with this policy. Dissents in ordinary cases, he
believed, weakened the authority of the Court and were of no public benefit.258
The bulk of Justice Washington's significant writing on constitutional
issues involved bankruptcy. The United States Constitution gives Congress the
power to establish "uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the
United States. ' 259 Congress was slow to exercise this power. Only one federal
bankruptcy act was passed during Washington's tenure on the Court. This was
promulgated in 1800 and was in effect only two and one-half years. 260 Growing out
of the financial panics of the 1790's, the first federal act was quite restrictive. Only
merchant-debtors were allowed benefit of the law and only creditors could initiate
proceedings under it.26 1 At the state level, there was continuous pressure for debtor
relief and the legislatures responded with a series of bankruptcy laws. As these
laws multiplied, problems associated with them grew. Merchants did business
across state lines, but the insolvency laws stopped at the borders.262 The state
bankruptcy laws generally favored debtors, were poorly administered, and had
unclear rules about preferences and priorities. 3
United States v. Fisher 4 arose under the short-lived Federal Bankruptcy
Act of 1800. Peter Blight, who filed for bankruptcy under the act, had endorsed a
bill of exchange which he later assigned. The bill of exchange was purchased by
the cashier of the Bank of the United States for the Secretary of the Treasury. The
United States sued for the full amount of the bill, claiming a preference under the
bankruptcy act. A federal statute passed in 1797 had given priority to the United
States in cases of insolvencies for all debts due the United States. The Bankruptcy
Act of 1800 contained a provision reading "nothing contained in this law shall in
any manner affect the right of preference to prior satisfaction of debts due to the
United States, as secured or provided by any law heretofore passed ..... When the
case was tried in the circuit court, Washington charged the jury that the provision in
the 1800 Act did not create a preference in the United States, but merely saved
257
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preferences previously granted. The 1797 Act, he continued, was for the sole
purpose of settling accounts between the United States and receivers of public
monies; it therefore created a preference only in bankruptcy cases involving such
receivers. So instructed, the jury found for the defendants, and the government took
the case to the Supreme Court on appeal.
The Supreme Court reversed, the Chief Justice writing the opinion. The
words of the 1797 statute "taken in their natural and usual sense," he held, gave the
United States priority in all cases of insolvency. He then went on to sound a theme
which would reappear fully developed in McCulloch v. Maryland,2 to Fisher's
argument that the Constitution granted Congress no specific authority to pass such
a law, Marshall responded:
It is claimed under the authority to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper to carry into execution the powers vested by
the constitution in the government of the United States, or in any
department or offices thereof.

In construing this clause it would be incorrect, and would produce
endless difficulties, if the opinion should be maintained that no
not indispensably necessary to give
law was authorized which 2was
66
effect to a specified power.
As Marshall's biographer points out, this was an express adoption of
a national bank and "an
Hamilton's position on the power of Congress to26establish
7
emphatic denial" of Jefferson's contrary opinion.
Washington had taken no part in the Supreme Court's decision because he
had presided below, but he was constrained to publish a dissenf. He explained,
perhaps with false modesty:
In any instance where I am so unfortunate as to differ with this
court, I cannot fail to doubt the correctness of my own opinion.
But if I cannot feel convinced of the error, I owe it in some
measure to myself, and to those who may be injured by the
expense and delay to which they have been exposed, to show at
least that the opinion was not hastily or inconsiderately given.268
In a meticulous opinion, Washington then carefully examined the 1797
statute, demonstrating that its stated purpose, confirmed by the content and pattern
of its specific sections, evinced a legislative intent to limit it to cases involving
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insolvency of public collectors. Washington did not address the issue of implied
powers. As a Hamiltonian Federalist, it cannot be doubted that he agreed with
Marshall on the point. He simply did not see a place for the doctrine in the case.
United States v. Fisher is one of several cases which demonstrate
convincingly that Washington was not unduly influenced by Marshall. He had a
mind of his own, and did not hesitate to disagree when he felt it appropriate. His
rare dissents were saved for cases he felt important enough to breach the unanimity
rule. In Golden v. Prince,6 9 Washington, sitting on circuit, held an 1812
Pennsylvania bankruptcy act to be unconstitutional as a law impairing the
obligation of contracts. For him the issue was simple: "A law.., which authorizes
the discharge of a contract, by a smaller sum, or at a different time, or in a different
manner than the parties have stipulated, impairs its obligation, by substituting for
the contract of the parties, one which they never entered into .... ,270
Washington made clear, however, that the constitutional infirmity existed
only with regard to contracts already in existence at its passage. A law "prospective
in its operation" would stand upon a different footing because the parties would
have contracted with knowledge of its existence. For Washington, this prospectiveretrospective distinction would remain a key consideration in constitutionality of
insolvency laws. In Golden, he went beyond this issue to drive another nail into the
coffin of state bankruptcy acts. The power granted Congress in the Constitution to
legislate on the subject of bankruptcy, he contended, is exclusive, and the states
have no power over the subject even if Congress declines to act. Washington feared
state laws that "would be dissimilar and frequently contradictory. '27 This theme
would recur in Washington's opinions. In commerce crossing state and federal
boundaries, he believed, potential litigants were entitled to consistent legal rules
which would govern their conduct wherever it occurred. 7 The decision alarmed
the commercial public, however. They were concerned about Washington's
position that state bankruptcy laws were precluded. Congress had been slow to act
in the field of bankruptcy and, if the states could not pass insolvency laws,
congressional inaction would mean there would be no debtor relief whatsoever.273
Five years later, in Sturges v. Crowninshield,274 the Supreme Court held a
New York insolvency law unconstitutional. Because it acted to discharge a note
given before its passage, it was a law impairing the obligation of contracts. In his
opinion, Chief Justice Marshall rejected the argument that the federal bankruptcy
power is exclusive. Washington did not dissent, although there is external evidence
269
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to suggest he did not abandon the contrary position he had taken in Golden.275
In Ogden v. Saunders, 6 the Supreme Court adopted the prospectiveretrospective distinction and upheld a New York statute in a case involving
discharge of an obligation incurred after the statute had been passed. Marshall
dissented. Washington filed a seriatim opinion which has been described as a
"blend of stubbornness and deference to precedent" 277 and "a solid opinion" of
"becoming modesty." 278 Washington acknowledged that he had always believed
the bankruptcy power to be exclusive, but he deferred to the contrary conclusion in
Sturgis out of respect for precedent.
In Mason v. Haile,279 decided the same year as Ogden v. Saunders,
Washington registered another of his rare dissents. The first paragraph of his
opinion contains an apology for breaking ranks with his fellow justices:
It has never been my habit to deliver dissenting opinions [he
wrote] in cases where it has been my misfortune to differ from
those which have been pronounced by a majority of this court.
Nor should I do so upon the present occasion, did I not believe
that the opinion just delivered is at variance with the fundamental
principle upon which the cases of Sturges v. Crowninshield and
Ogden v. Saunders have been decided.280
A debtor, with the familiar-sounding name of Nathan Haile, had given a
bond that he would remain in debtor's prison and not try to escape until lawfully
discharged. Haile came within the ambit of an insolvency statute subsequently
passed by Rhode Island and was released from prison. In an action on the bond, it
was contended that the insolvency act was void as a law impairing the obligation of
contracts. In an opinion by Justice Thompson, the Supreme Court held not.
Washington's dissent takes the position that the majority has discarded the
retrospective-prospective distinction which was the basis for the decision in Ogden.
The Dartmouth College case' gets only a brief mention in a leading
constitutional law text of today,282 but it was of pivotal importance in its time. The
case framed the question whether the contract clause "constitutionalized protection
for vested property rights. ' ' 283 The case had a tortuous history 284 and the Supreme
275
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Court was deeply divided. 85 The issue in the case was whether a New Hampshire
statute seeking to "pack" the Board of Trustees by increasing its size violated the
college's 1769 charter and was, therefore, a law impairing the obligation of
contracts.286 In contrast to long opinions by Marshall and Story, Washington's
separate opinion is direct and concise. He poses two simple questions: Is the 1769
charter a contract? If so, do the laws in question impair its obligation? He defines a
contract as a transaction between two or more persons in which each incurs an
obligation and acquires a right. A grant is a contract, he reasons, asserting that the
point was decided in Fletcher v. Peck,287 and the creation of a corporation 28by
charter "is ... such a grant as includes an obligation of the nature of a contract. 8
Why did Washington write separately in Dartmouth College? Professors
Blaustein and Mersky argue that he feared the consequences of Justice Story's
separate opinion and aimed to lessen its impact. Story had written "a sweeping
obiter dictum which brought all corporations under the Contract Clause .... 289
Perhaps also, he felt the case to be much simpler than the opinions of Marshall and
Story suggest, and sought to diffuse the anticipated public reaction to the decision
by placing it upon the clearest possible grounds.
The impact of the Dartmouth College case is summarized by Professor
Remini as follows:
The importance of this decision became more and more apparent
as the nation continued to develop into an industrial society.
According to this very broad reading of the Constitution, states
were severely limited in their authority over corporations, thereby
allowing private entrepreneurs considerable leeway in their
operations. In effect it helped promote economic expansion over
the next several decades by protecting corporate activities from
interference by local legislatures.290
No consideration of Justice Washington's constitutional cases would be
complete without reference to Corfield v. Coryell.291 This case is notorious for the
confusion it has induced concerning the meaning of the privileges and immunities
284
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clause of Article IV, which reads: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to
all of the Privileges and Immunities of Citizens of the several States., 292 The
phrase first appeared in the Articles of Confederation which stated that its purpose
was "to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse.

.

." particularly

with the rights of free ingress and egress, trade and commerce on the same terms as
local citizens. z The clause was thus intended as a prohibition against
discrimination in favor of a state's residents against non-residents. "[A] citizen
from out-of-State would have the benefit of the laws as he found them, without
94 This was the meaning of the clause
discrimination against him as an outsider., 2 29
5
and by Story himself.296
Kent,
accepted by the commentators such as
Washington's opinion in Corfield has been interpreted in modem times as
attempting to introduce a "natural rights" philosophy of constitutional
interpretation. Pursuant to this theory, courts would be free to give the clause
specific content by holding that it protects fundamental rights which the courts
would develop as specific cases arose. This was the gloss Justice Brennan, relying
on Professor Tribe's constitutional law treatise, put on Corfield in Baldwin v. Fish
& Game Commission of Montana,297 where he said: "Mr. Justice Washington
believed that the clause was designed to guarantee certain 'fundamental' rights to
all United298States citizens, regardless of the rights afforded by a State to its own
citizens.
The facts of Corfield were simple. A New Jersey statute made it unlawful
for non-residents to gather oysters in the rivers, bays, or waters of the state.
Plaintiff, a citizen of Pennsylvania, was the owner of a vessel, the Hiram, which
had been seized for violating the statute and sold to satisfy the fine imposed.
Plaintiff sued to recover his vessel, claiming the seizure was unlawful. Among
other arguments, he contended the New Jersey statute violated the privileges and
immunities clause of Article IV. The case came on for trial before Washington on
circuit, who submitted it to the jury subject to later opinion of the court on the legal
issues. In an opinion setting aside a verdict for the plaintiff, Washington rejected
the argument that the New Jersey statute violated the privileges and immunities
clause. The following passage from the opinion, entirely dicta, has been quoted
down through the years when courts and others have considered the meaning of the
privileges and immunities of national citizenship:

292

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, ci. 1.

293

See CHARLES FAIRMAN, Reconstruction and Reunion 1864-88 in 6 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OFTHE UNITED STATES 1121 (Paul Freund ed., 1971).
294
Id
295

Id
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See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 582 (Melville

Bigelow ed., 1891). See also JOSEPH STORY, A FAMILIAR ExPOSITION OF THE CONSTIrUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES § 409, 291-92 (1840).
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436 U.S. 371,395-98 (1978).
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Id. at 395.
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The next question is, whether this act infringes the section of the
constitution which declares that 'the citizens of each state shall be
entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several states?' The inquiry is, what are the privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several states? We feel no hesitation
in confining these expressions to those privileges and immunities
which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to
the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times,
been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose
this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and
sovereign. What these fundamental principles are, it would
perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may
however, be all comprehended under the following general heads:
Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty,
with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and
to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to
such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the
general good of the whole. The right of a citizen of one state to
pass through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade,
agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the
benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain
actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to take, hold and
dispose of property, either real or personal; and an exemption
from higher taxes or impositions that are paid by the other citizens
of the state; may be mentioned as some of the particular privileges
and immunities of citizens, which are clearly embraced by the
general description of privileges deemed to be fundamental: to
which they may be added, the elective franchise, as regulated and
established by the laws or constitution of the state in which it is to
be exercised. These, and many others which might be mentioned,
are, strictly speaking, privileges and immunities, and the
enjoyment of them by the citizens of each state, in every other
state, was manifestly calculated (to use the expressions of the
preamble of the corresponding provision in the old articles of
confederation) 'the better to secure the perpetual mutual
friendship and299
intercourse among the people of the different states
of the Union.'
In view of Washington's approach to judging expressed in his other
opinions, his familiarity with the classic texts, and his general agreement with Story
on constitutional issues, it is difficult to accept the proposition offered by Brennan
and Tribe. In deciding that fishing a state's oyster beds was not a privilege and
immunity guaranteed to citizens who were residents of other states, Washington

299
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found his governing principle in Grotius. 300 The sovereign, Grotius opines, has no
dominion over wild beasts, birds and fishes which have not been caught, but the
sovereign does have dominion over the lands and waters where the creatures are
found. The sovereign may therefore restrict fishing and hunting in such lands and
waters to its own citizens. 30' The catalogue of specific privileges and immunities
Washington lists are therefore more appropriately seen as examples of wellestablished rights a sovereign may not reserve exclusively to its own citizens, not
as an open-ended invitation to courts to fill up the clause with specific rights which
must be accorded to all based on natural law principles. Professor Fairman was
closer to the mark when he said:
Doubtless Justice Washington's words, as reported, far overleaped
his thought. One should not suppose - because it would have been
preposterous - that he meant that when the Framers carried
forward the obligation assumed in the Articles of Confederation
they widened it to charge each State to accord to citizens from
sister States whatever the Supreme Court might hold to be
"fundamental" in "free governments," regardless of whether the
State made any such provision for its own citizens. At any rate, it
would have taken much more than a dictum from a Justice on
circuit to establish such a proposition.302
For Washington to author an opinion which confused rather than clarified
the law was unusual, perhaps unique. We should remember the circumstances
under which it was offered and the fact that Washington probably did not expect it
to have a wide audience. The opinion was apparently delivered orally from the
bench after a jury trial.303 By 1824, more and more cases were contained in
published reports, but still not all circuit opinions were published. Corfield was
among those opinions of Justice Washington reported by Richard Peters, Jr. who
reconstructed the opinions after the fact relying on Washington's notes and his own
memory. Corfield does not fit into the paradigm of Washington's Supreme Court
opinions which were characteristically narrow, focused, tightly reasoned, and
based on accepted authority. Perhaps the opinion attained its wide audience
because it was for years the only significant judicial construction of Article IV's
privileges and immunities clause. At any rate, Corfield is not typical of
Washington's judicial work and it is unfortunate for his reputation that it survives
as perhaps his best known opinion.
The constitutional cases reveal Washington's Federalist principles, but also
his faith in a republican form of government. It is apparent that he accepted
3Go

Id. at 548-52.

301

Id.

302

FAIRMAN, supra note 293, at 1123.

303

The case was tried to a jury in the April Term, 1823. It was argued on the legal issues presented in
the October Term, 1824, and finally decided by Judge Washington at the April Term, 1825. See Corfied, 6
F. Cas. at 550. Then, as now, justice could be slow and deliberate.
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Wilson's proposition that power flows upward from the popular will. Because the
Constitution is the expression of this popular will in its highest form, courts have
the obligation to protect it from legislative interference. To preserve the legitimacy
of the courts, however, the power of judicial review is to be exercised sparingly and
only in clear cases. Similarly, as the bankruptcy cases disclose, he believed in the
supremacy of the federal government and he preferred uniform rules to govern
commercial matters.
The constitutional cases also show Washington to be a "team player" on
the Supreme Court. He accepted Chief Justice Marshall's view that the Court could
enhance the authority of its decisions by speaking with one voice. Washington did
not allow his loyalty to foreclose his obligation to make up his own mind, however.
He did occasionally disagree with his colleagues, but he saved his separate opinions
for cases he believed to be compelling.
B.

Prize Law and Marine Insurance

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries maritime commerce
was one of the most significant activities in which America engaged.3t 4 Maritime
law was, for the most part, an international system in which each nation followed
the same rules. Early American courts considered the question whether they would
follow the established international order or would develop a uniquely American
approach to the issues presented. Britain was the principal naval and maritime
commercial power of the era. Consequently, many of the generally accepted rules
had been developed by the British admiralty courts. The tendency to accept these
rules as binding clashed with American resistance to British authority which was an
outgrowth of the Revolution.
It is ironic that Bushrod Washington, who grew up on a Virginia farm,
became (with the possible exception of Joseph Story) the foremost maritime judge
of the age. He apparently decided more marine insurance cases on circuit than any
other justice. 305 It is said that his duties on circuit gave him "an encyclopedic grasp
of admiralty and maritime law" which earned him the respect and high opinion of
Chief Justice Marshall in this area.30 6
The entanglement of American shipping and commercial interests in the
struggle between France and England produced a flood of prize cases. The United
States quickly resorted to trade sanctions as a response to French interference with
her commerce. The undeclared "Quasi-War" with France lasted two-and-a-half
years from 1798 to 1800 and was confined to the sea, primarily in the West
Indies. 30 7 Congress passed three separate statutes, known as the Non-Intercourse
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See WHITE, supranote 15, at 884.

See William Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the JudiciaryAct of 1789: The
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Acts, which restricted trade with France and her possessions. 3 8
Problems were not, however, confined to France. In 1807, President
Jefferson secured congressional passage of an Embargo Act against vigorous
opposition from the New England states and the Federalist party.30 9 Directed at
both England and France, the embargo prohibited virtually all exporting of
American goods. The coasting trade was permitted, but shippers were required to
post bonds which would be forfeited if the vessels engaged in foreign rather than
coastal trade.310 Other embargoes followed leading to war with the British in 1812,
a war with significant impact on American shipping and foreign trade. Litigation
resulting from these trade restrictions and the War of 1812 continued long past the
war's end in 1815.
The maritime cases are particularly revealing with regard to the nature and
sources of law in Washington's day. The practice of publishing written case reports
was virtually unknown until well after the Revolution. 311 Early case reports were
often compiled by lawyers, primarily for their own use, from notes taken while the
judges were reading their opinions from the bench.312 Washington, himself, was
one of the early reporters of cases decided by the Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia and that is exactly the way he put together the bulk of his reports.31' He sat
in court as the opinions were delivered from the bench, took notes, and
reconstructed the opinions as best he could.314 The opinions of the Supreme Court
of the United States were regularly published, but they were not published
promptly - the process typically took months and sometimes years.315
Washington's own circuit court opinions were published by Richard Peters, Jr., to
whom Washington left his notes. Peters worked from the notes and his own
memory (his father, a United States District Court Judge, had sat regularly with
Washington on circuit). Many of Washington's cases were not reported by Peters
until decades after they had been delivered from the bench. In such an environment
it is not surprising that the written reports were often inaccurate or incomplete.
As a result, written case law did not occupy the position of authority it
enjoys today. Courts believed in the precedential value of the common law and
sought to follow it, but they found evidence of the law in sources other than case
reports. 16 Commentaries and treatises were frequently used. The dearth of reported
case law explains the immense popularity of Blacksone's Commentaries in the
308
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317

United States.
Judges inherited a tradition binding them to explicit sources of law.318 To
lawyers and courts legal authority was a hierarchy or pyramid. At the top was
"fundamental law," the organic law establishing the basic principles of society. In
America, this was the Constitution.319 In addition, courts spoke often of "positive
law." Positive law was a system of specific rules laid down by an authoritative
political entity. In America, positive law included, in addition to the Constitution,
the acts of Congress and state legislatures. In cases where they were applicable,
courts deemed themselves bound by positive law expressed in statutes unless it
conflicted with the fundamental law as expressed in the Constitution. Positive law
was seen as distinct from natural or moral law - principles of fundamental truth and
basic right and wrong. Judges were expected to limit themselves to application of
the rules of positive law where such rules existed. 320 "[T]he tradition of positivism
meant that the judge ought to be will-less. 3 21 But what if an issue were not
resolved by a specific provision of fundamental or positive law? In such cases
courts were to "find" the applicable rule of decision by resort to natural or moral
law. They looked to a myriad of sources as evidence of what the natural or moral
rule should be. American law in the early Nineteenth Century was "an amalgam of
seven discrete sources." 3 22 Professor White summarizes these sources as follows:
In rough outline, and in descending order, the sources were the
Constitution; the common law, which contained numerous
subcategories within it; the law of nature, or of nations, a source
of unwritten principles of natural justice; the civil law, which
included not only principles established in civilian codes but the
writings of civilian commentators; and specialized sources whose
pertinence was restricted to discrete areas, such as equity, the law
merchants as laid down in specialized mercantile courts in
England and on the Continent, the lex loci, which referred to the
local law of a jurisdiction on a matter particularly confined to that
jurisdiction, the "law admiralty and maritime," as manifested in
the decisions of the British and continental admiralty courts, and
American federal and state statutes.323
Statutes, as part of the positive law, "had a significant claim to authoritativeness,"
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318
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but only in those discrete situations to which they specifically applied.3 24
Courts would typically categorize the case with which they were dealing
and look to authorities in that category for rules of decision. Often these authorities
were treatises and commentaries rather than case law. The maritime cases illustrate
this process. Here the category was admiralty, the sources wide-ranging and
international, often including classic texts on natural law such as Grotius, Pufendorf
and Rutherforth. 325 In many instances, the texts were more readily accessible than
the cases.

One of Justice Washington's first opinions for the Supreme Court was in
Bas v. Tingy, 26 a case arising from the undeclared war with France. Tingy, as
commander of the privateer "Ganges," filed a libel against the ship "Eliza," her
cargo, and Bas, her master. The Eliza was an American ship captured by a French
privateer on March 31, 1799. She was subsequently retaken by the Ganges exactly
three weeks later on April 21, 1799. At issue in the case was an apparent conflict
between two of the statutes passed in response to French naval depredations. The
Act of June 28, 1798, required that any American vessel recaptured by a public
armed vessel of the United States should be restored to her owners upon payment
to the re-captors of one-eighth of the value of the vessel, its goods and effects. The
Act of March 2, 1799, allowed salvage of one-eighth of the value if the ship were
retaken from an "enemy" within twenty-four hours; this was increased to one-half
if over ninety-six hours had elapsed between the original capture and the recapture.
The Eliza had been in French possession for over ninety-six hours and Tingy
claimed half her value, not one-eighth. He argued that hostilities with the French
made France an "enemy" within the latter statute even though there had been no
formal declaration of war, and, because the 1799 act covered the same subject as
the 1798 act, the latter implicitly repealed the former. Bas responded that the 1798
act was specifically directed to commerce with France while the 1799 act was more
general, establishing a permanent system of governance for the Navy.
The latter
3 27
act, he contended, would only apply to enemies in a "declared war.,
In a seriatim opinion, Washington reasoned that France was an enemy
within the terms of the 1799 act if a state of war existed. He concluded that there
are two types of war: Declared, solemn and perfect war entailing complete
hostilities between one nation and another; and imperfect war which is limited in
nature and extent. In war of the second kind, the participants are confined by their
"commissions" and can proceed no farther. By commission, he meant the specific
parameters of any enabling legislation or executive directions relating to the
specific conflict.3 28 He deemed the war with France to be of the second kind; it was
war nevertheless and France an "enemy" within the act. The two statutes were
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therefore in conflict and the last in point of time effectively repealed the earlier.329
One hundred and seventy years later, Bas v. Tingy was followed in an
opinion upholding the constitutionality of the war in Vietnam?. 0° But the case had a
more immediate impact; the Jeffersonian Republicans, still sympathetic to France,
were outraged. Republican newspapers suggested for the first time that judges
should be impeached for their decisions. 331 As we have seen, this cloud on the
horizon soon became a storm.
Croudson v. Leonarde 2 squarely presented the issue of whether the factual
determinations of foreign courts of admiralty would be given preclusive effect in
American courts. The brig "Fame" had attempted, on a voyage from Alexandria,
Virginia, to break the British blockade of Martinique, a French island in the West
Indies. The Fame was captured by a British ship, carried into Barbados and
condemned as a prize by a British vice-admiralty court. The vice-admiralty court
had found as a fact, necessary to support its order of condemnation, that the Fame
had attempted to break the blockade.
The Fame's owners had secured a policy of insurance and had warranted
the vessel's neutrality. Therefore, if the Fame had in fact attempted to break the
blockade, the warranty of neutrality had been violated, voiding the policy. The
owners sued the underwriters in the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia and
obtained a jury verdict; the jury had therefore reached a conclusion opposite from
the British vice-admiralty court on the question of whether the blockade had been
violated. The underwriters appealed, arguing that the British vice-admiralty court's
finding precluded submission of the same issue to an American jury. Justice
Johnson and Justice Washington wrote separate opinions for the Court reversing
the verdict below. Washington went straight to the point:
This question upon this subject has long been at rest in England.
The established law in the courts of that country is, that the
sentence of a foreign court of competent jurisdiction condemning
the property upon the ground that it was not neutral, is so entirely
conclusive of the fact so decided, that it can never be controverted,
directly or collaterally, in any other court having concurrent
jurisdiction. a 3
Washington reasoned that "all the world are parties in an admiralty
cause." 4 The action was in rem, against the vessel, and thus any person from any
jurisdiction can file a claim. Washington believed general rules of law applicable to
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all and finality of decisions were goals of the law which should outweigh the
possibility for "irregular and unjust judgments."''
Washington supported his
conclusion with a review of English decisions since the reign of Charles II with
particular emphasis on the views of Lord Mansfield.
The result in Croudson could hardly have been popular. Not only was a
decision in favor of an American shipper reversed on the authority of a foreign
court, but a jury verdict was overturned. Since the Revolution, Americans had
maintained a particular affinity for juries as a bulwark against government abuse.'"
As noted above, the Revolution also produced a significant negative reaction to
English law. Several states passed statutes restricting the reception of English
precedent in American courts.337 Most of these statutes provided that English cases
decided since the Revolution would not be binding in the courts of the states.33 8
Kentucky went to the extreme, prohibiting in 1807 the mere mention of British
cases decided since July 4, 1776.3 9 Washington was aware of this problem, of
course, but he was determined not to let it frustrate the quest for international
uniformity in maritime cases. He acknowledged that "English decisions have lost
the weight of authority in the courts of the United States,"' 34 0 but went on to say: "I
do not hold myself bound by such decisions made since the revolution, although, as
evidence of what the law was prior to that period, I read and respect them."34'1
Another significant aspect of Croudson v. Leonard is a comment by
Washington on the proper spheres of court and legislature in the development and
application of law. Washington acknowledged that general principles and rules of
law could produce unfair or unjust results in specific cases. It was up to the
legislature to fix the problem, he suggested, "if the injustice of the belligerent
powers, and of their courts, should render this rule oppressive.. .. 3,42 To him, the
role of the Court was limited:
I hold the rules of law, when once firmly established, to be beyond
the control of those who are merely to pronounce what the law is,
and if from any circumstance it has become impolitic, in a
national point of view, it is for the nation to annul or modify it.'
Many other prize cases arising from the embargo and the Napoleonic Wars
335
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reached the Supreme Court. Washington frequently wrote opinions in these cases.
Additionally, the Pennsylvania circuit was one of the busiest admiralty jurisdictions
in America. Here, Washington often heard appeals in admiralty cases from the
district court. The expertise he developed on circuit was put to use by the Chief
Justice who assigned many opinions in admiralty cases to Washington.
The cases disclose the extent to which American ingenuity devised
methods to subvert the embargo or avoid the British blockade. One method was to
secure a clearance from one American port to another, post a bond under the
Embargo Act, and then detour to a foreign port. The statutes recognized that
deviations might be necessitated by weather or the dangers of the sea, and such a
deviation if legitimate, was a defense to forfeiture under the act.34 4 In Brig James
Wells v. United States,345 the Court considered the burden of proof in a case of
"deviation." The James Wells had sailed from New England under a coastal
clearance for St. Mary's, Georgia, but actually traveled to St. Barts in the West
Indies where it off-loaded a cargo of flour. The appellants had argued that stress of
weather and the unseaworthy condition of the vessel had compelled them to travel
to St. Barts and off-load the cargo in order to repair the ship. Once the cargo was
unloaded, they contended, permission could not be obtained to reload it. In a short
opinion for the Court, Washington recognized the strong temptation of merchants
to violate the law and held that, when a deviation is shown, the shipowner has a
very heavy burden to prove he comes within the exception. Washington found the
evidence of the danger of continuing the original voyage to be "nowhere positively
affirmed. "34
When war broke out in 1812, numerous American vessels were abroad or
at sea and, therefore, vulnerable to capture as prizes. John Quincy Adams, the
American ambassador at St. Petersburg, encouraged American ships in Baltic ports
to go to London and off-load their cargoes, obtaining British licenses for the return
trip to the United States. Adams saw this as the only way the ships could get safely
home through the British blockade. The Joseph4 7 rejected this as a defense to a
claimed forfeiture for trading with the enemy. Citing British precedent and prior
decisions of the Supreme Court, Washington conceded that the case was one of
"peculiar hardship" but that the facts afforded "no legal excuse which it is
competent to this court to admit as the basis of decision." 34 8 The vessel was
deemed to be on one continuous voyage from the United States until her return; if
she traded with the enemy during any part of that voyage, she was subject to
seizure. 34 9
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Similar on its facts to The Joseph was The Grotius,350 in which
Washington again wrote for the Court. The Grotiuswas the first case argued in the
Supreme Court by Daniel Webster, who appeared on March 12, 1814, as counsel
for the claimants. 35' Webster raised an issue of fact concerning validity of the
capture and the Court continued the case for further proof.35 2 The following year,
The Grotius was again up for decision and again Washington wrote for the Court.
The Court reversed the judgment below which had condemned the Grotius to the
United States, but rejected Webster's argument that there had been no capture; it
was ordered that the ship be condemned to her captors as a lawful prize. 3
In The Venus as4 Washington returned to the theme of the Brig James
Wells and wrote an opinion placing a heavy burden of proof on a merchant seeking
to bring himself within an exception to rules requiring forfeiture.355 The Venus is
one of the occasional cases in which Washington and Marshall differed.35 6 The
Venus sailed for New York from Liverpool on July 4, 1812, without knowledge
that the United States had declared war on Great Britain sixteen days before.35 7 On
August 6, she was captured by an American privateer, taken to Massachusetts, and
libeled as a prize in the district court.35 8 One of the owners of the ship, Maitland, a
naturalized American citizen, had been born in Britain, and had returned there to
live prior to the war.3"9 The principal issue was whether Maitland was domiciled in
America or Britain; if British, the Venus was a lawful prize, but if Maitland were
30
still an American domiciliary, he was entitled to the return of his property.
Washington first looked to "writers upon the law of nations,, 36' particularly Vattel
and Grotius, for a definition of domicile, and then reviewed decisions of the prize
courts and the common law courts in England. He concluded:
If it sufficiently appear[s] that the intention of removing was to
350

12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 456 (1814).

351

REMiNI, supra note 285, at 119.

352

See The Grotius, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 457.

In his recent biography, Professor Remini says that Webster, on his original appearance before the
Supreme Court, won a rehearing and extra time for his clients, and that the following year the decision of the
lower court was reversed. See REMI, supra note 285, at 119. While this statement is correct on its face, it
creates the false impression that Webster won the case. In fact, the Court awarded the Grotius to her captors,
not to her former owners whom Webster represented.
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See id.
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make a permanent settlement, or for an indefinite time, the right of
domicile is acquired by a residence even of a few days. This is one
of the rules of the British Courts, and it appears to be perfectly
reasonable. Another is, that a neutral or subject, found residing in
a foreign country is presumed to be there animo manendi; and if a
state of war should bring his national character into question, it
lies upon him to explain the circumstances of his residence. 6 2
Washington then considered the consequences of acquiring a foreign
domicile.363 He relied on Sir William Scott, a British admiralty law expert, and The
Indian Chief,3 4 a decision of a British admiralty court, and held that, having
acquired a foreign domicile the claimant "ought to be bound by all the
consequences of it ....,3 The decision below upholding Maitland's claim was
reversed and the Venus was condemned to her captors.366 In a long opinion, the
Chief Justice dissented.367 Marshall found the decisions of the British admiralty
courts to be insensitive to the rights of neutrals and not in accord with "the view of
international law taken by nations with less naval strength than Great Britain."36
Washington wrote for the Court in several other prize cases decided by the
Supreme Court in 1814. In The Frances(French'sClaim), 369 Washington held that
no lien ulon enemy property would be recognized as an offset against the captors
unless the lien was one recognized in international law independent of any contract
between the consignee and the consignor. 370 In practical effect, such cases made it
very difficult for merchants to avoid the consequences of capture by contractual
provisions with shippers.
The Hiram371 involved a device used by the British to attract commerce
with Americans in spite of the war. Admiral Sawyer, in charge of the British fleet
in the Atlantic, had written to the British consul in New York stating that he would
not molest American vessels carrying dry goods to Spain and Portugal. 2 The
consul would then entice American merchants to ship goods to Spain and Portugal

362

Id. at 279.

363

See id. at 278.

364
365

Bryan v. Lofftus's Administrators, 39 Am. Dec. 242, 1 Rob. 12 (referred to as The Indian Chief).
See The Venus, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 253, 280 (1814).
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See id. at 287.
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See id. at 288.
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by assuring them that they could sail there without fear of capture.373 At the time,
British troops on the Iberian peninsula were locked in a desperate struggle with
Napoleon and the British were finding it difficult to keep them supplied. 37 4
American ships bound for Portugal and Spain would, when stopped by British
warships, be given licenses immunizing them from capture and allowed to
proceed.3 75 The Hiram, owned by American merchants, sailed for Lisbon from
Boston on September 24, 1812.376 She was captured on October 15 by the
American privateer Thorn, brought into Massachusetts and libeled as enemy
property. 3 7 Following a prior decision by the Supreme Court in The Julia,378
Washington held that traveling under a license and passport of protection issued by
the enemy would subject the ship and cargo to forfeiture as enemy property.37
Washington reaffirmed the rule of The Hiram three years later in a short opinion
for the Court.180
Washington again looked to the "law of nations" for a rule of decision in
The Big Alberta v. Moran.381 The Alberta, owned by a Spanish subject residing in
Cuba, was captured in 1810 by a French privateer who brought her to New
Orleans. 38 2 A libel filed in the U.S. District Court there by her owners contended
that the captor ship, L'Epine, was not commissioned to capture Spanish ships and,
even if she were so commissioned, had been armed in New Orleans and manned by
American citizens contrary to the law of nations. 3 m Washington, with classic
directness, asserted that the only issue was the jurisdiction of the district court.384
Trial of captors on the high seas, he said, belongs exclusively to the courts of the
nation to which the captor belongs.m But there are exceptions to this general
rule.3 8 If a privateer has been illegally equipped or her armament augmented in a
neutral port, the courts of the neutral nation possess the power and duty to restore
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the prize to its owner. 387 "This is necessary to the vindication of their own
neutrality., 388 Washington went on to deny the captors' claim to the salvage. 8 9 The
prize had originally sailed for Belize, but had put into New Orleans. 390 The captors
claimed the diversion to New Orleans was necessitated by a severe gale and want
of provisions; the prize crew argued that, as a consequence, they had saved the ship
and were entitled to salvage.391 With laconic eloquence, Washington made short
work of this argument:
This claim is entirely inadmissible. Salvage is allowed as a reward
for the meritorious conduct of the salvor, and in consideration of a
benefit conferred on a person whose property he has saved....
Nothing could be more remote from the intentions of the captain
of the3 92privateer than to render a service to this ship and her
cargo.

Arnroyd v. Williams, 393 decided by Washington on circuit, represents an
extreme example of the rule requiring acceptance of the decrees of foreign
admiralty courts. An American vessel sailing from a British island in the West
Indies for New London, Connecticut, was captured by a French privateer and taken
to St. Martin's where she was held while condemnation proceedings were instituted
against her in the French admiralty court at Guadeloupe. 394 The ground for her
seizure was violation of Napoleon's 1807 Milan Decree which unilaterally declared
that any ships submitting to British search or conforming to the requirements of the
British orders-in-council would be subject to French seizure. 395 While at St.
Martin's, and before the admiralty court at Guadeloupe had acted, the vessel was
sold to a bona fide purchaser.396 The admiralty court subsequently held the seizure
valid on the ground that the ship had violated the Milan Decree.397 The Milan
Decree was itself, the parties admitted, a violation of the law of nations. 398 The
owner of the vessel sued in the U.S. District Court for the District of Pennsylvania
387

See id.

388

Id.
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See id. at 366.

390

See id. at 359.

391

See The Brig Alberta, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 367.
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Id.
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11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 423 (1813).
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See id.
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See HASKINS & JOHNSON, supranote 14, at 542.
See Arnroyd, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 423.
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See id.
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to recover his property and, from a judgment in his favor, appeal was taken to the
Circuit Court. 399 Washington held that the decree of the French admiralty court was
conclusive to divest the title of the original owners.400 The sale to the purchaser at
St. Martin's was therefore valid, and the owners had no right to return of the
ship. 401 This was true even though the French court had itself proceeded upon a
ground repugnant to the "law of nations., 40 2 In 1813, the case came before the
United States Supreme Court where the decision was affirmed in an opinion by the
Chief Justice.4 03
Justice Washington's last reported maritime case was The Seneca.4 m This
case reaffirms the proposition that there is one maritime law for all nations. 40 1 The
owners of the Seneca had fallen out over who was to make repairs to the ship and
who had the authority to appoint a master to take her to sea.40 6 The opposing camps
were evenly split, each owning a one-half interest.407 One group of owners filed a
petition for an order directing that the ship be sold.40 8 The district court found no
authority to order a sale and dismissed the petition. 40 9 Washington reversed,
holding that the Judiciary Act of 1789 granted jurisdiction over all cases of410a
maritime nature whether they "be particularly of admiralty cognizance or not.,
Searching the various maritime authorities, Washington conceded that a power of
part-owners of a ship to force a sale normally did not exist.411 He reached far back
in time to find an exception to the general rule in cases where the owners are
W 41 2 The Marine Code of France, published in 1681, which he
evenly divided.
determined to be a part of the law of nations and applicable to the case, allowed
such a sale in cases of4 14evenly divided ownership. 41 3 Accordingly, Washington
ordered the Seneca sold.
399
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The prize cases proceed upon the implicit proposition that there is one
"law of nations" binding throughout the world.415 As such, the prize courts of
every nation theoretically apply the same law and their decrees are to be given full
faith and credit everywhere.416 Prize cases are actions in rem to which "all the
world" are parties.4 17 The jurisdiction with possession of the ship tries the case and
all claimants must press their claims in that one case or lose out. The quest for
uniform rules and certainty of decisions is thus allowed to trump considerations of
equity and fairness in individual cases. The benefits of such a doctrine to
commerce, if it were to be consistently applied, are obvious. Merchants have one
set of rules and get one opportunity in prize cases; they do not have to deal with
inconsistent rules of law and decisions by competing courts. Once a prize court
acts, the decision is final for all.
Closely related to the prize cases is the subject of marine insurance.
Dozens of marine insurance cases came before Washington on circuit and he
occasionally wrote for the Supreme Court in such cases. The marine insurance
cases, like the prize cases, presented the issue of whether American courts would
follow the developing law of nations or would create a uniquely American solution
to the issues presented. Here, as in the prize cases, Washington was a force pushing
the courts toward the international approach and the acceptance of precedent which
was primarily British. Marine insurance dates to the late Middle Ages418 and was
"in full use" in England by the reign of Elizabeth 1.419 In Tudor England, marine
insurance cases were assigned to the common law courts. 420 Because of their
"maritime flavor," however, the law in such cases was heavily influenced by the
civil law and commercial customs and usages.421
In England, marine insurance generally followed the "Lloyd's" pattern in
which individual underwriters joined to share the risks of multiple voyages .4 22 In
America, however, most marine underwriting was done through incorporated
insurance companies.42 3 The Lloyd's system was designed primarily to share risks
among merchants who often operated as both insurers and insureds. 424 Rise of the
corporate form effectively divided insurers and insureds into two camps, often with
competing interests.425 Moreover, marine insurance contracts supplied "first party"

416

See Armroyd v. Williams, 1 F. Cas. 1132, 1133 (C.C.D. Pa. 1811).
See id.
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Id.
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coverage only-the policies were designed to provide indemnification for personal
loss, not protection against liability to third parties.426

The development of insurance law in the Eighteenth Century is associated
with William Murray, First Earl of Mansfield, 427 who served as Chief Justice of the
Court of King's Bench from 1756 until his death in 1793.428 The fact that he was a
Scot, not English, and was a student of Roman and civil law, 429 may have made
Lord Mansfield's opinions more readily acceptable in America where resentment
against English law lingered. Mansfield had a huge impact on American
commercial law in general and on marine insurance law in particular.
The general acceptance of the English practice in marine insurance was
confirmed in Croudson v. Leonard,3 discussed above, which held the decree of a
foreign prize court to be conclusive on issues of neutrality raised under a policy of
insurance. 431 Justice Story's opinion on circuit in DeLovio v. Boit 2 held that
marine insurance cases were within federal admiralty jurisdiction.4"3 The decision
was popular with underwriters because they did not like juries.4 -4 The state courts
retained concurrent jurisdiction, however, and plaintiffs could still obtain jury trials
by suing in state court.43 Nevertheless, numerous marine insurance cases came to
the federal courts as admiralty cases; at the same time, many marine insurance
cases were tried to juries in the federal circuit courts under diversity jurisdiction. 4 6
Professor Fletcher calls marine insurance the best example of a general
common law subject jointly administered by state and federal courts.437 "To an
unusual degree," he says, "it fulfilled the twin aspirations of the age for the law
merchant: certainty and uniformity."8
Washington's contribution to the development of marine insurance law
was significant. His first opinion for the Supreme Court in a marine insurance case
was a seriatim opinion in Marine Insurance Co. of Alexandria v. Wilson. 439 The
426

See id. at 335, n.198.

427

See HORWrIz, supranote 7, at 227.
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policy in question stipulated that there was no obligation of the underwriters to pay
if the vessel were condemned as unsound at the inception of the risk.440 The voyage
began on October 24. 44' A report of survey found the vessel unsound as of October
31. 442 Washington's opinion held that because there was no evidence of
unsoundness as of the 24th, the obligation to pay was not absolved.44 3 Professor
Johnson sees this case as an uncharacteristic departure from English insurance law
which created a rebuttable presumption that any unseaworthiness existed at the
beginning of the voyage. 4" As Johnson points out, however, the point was not
raised in oral argument or the Court's deliberations." 5
Washington contributed a second seriatim opinion on the subject in Marine
Insurance Co. of Alexandria v. Tucker,44 6 a case involving issues of deviation and
non-inception of a voyage. The vessel in question had been insured for a trip from
Kingston, Jamaica, to Alexandria, Virginia." 7 After taking on its cargo, the ship
determined to visit Baltimore first and then proceed to Alexandria. 448 She was
captured before reaching the "dividing point" of the voyage.449 Washington's
opinion held that because the capture occurred before the dividing line between
Baltimore and Alexandria, there was only an intended, not an actual, deviation and
the policy was not avoided. 50 In a scholarly opinion, Washington traced the
English cases to the reign of George II and distinguished opinions by Lord
Mansfield and Lord Kenyon. 451 The opinion contains the following comment on the
value of precedent:
The criticism of counsel for the plaintiffs in error, upon the rule
contended for by the defendants, ought not, in my opinion, to avail
them, if that rule be firmly established by uniform decisions: for in
questions which respect the rights of property, it is better to adhere
to principles once fixed, though, originally they might not have
been perfectly free from all objection, than to unsettle the law, in
order to render it more consistent with the dictates of sound
440
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reason.

The concept that it was more important for a rule to be settled than that it be settled
correctly was a theme directly derived from Lord Mansfield. 5 3
On circuit, Washington probably decided more marine insurance cases
than any other Supreme Court Justice. 45 He sat in Philadelphia, one of the principal
American seaports, and in Trenton, New Jersey, which embraced cases from the
mid-Atlantic coastline. Geography, and the commercial activity associated with it,
therefore combined to make Washington a maritime judge. 45 5 Two cases decided
by him on circuit in 1808 illustrate his decisional process in marine insurance
matters and the influence he had on other courts in the field. Queen v. Union
Insurance Co.,45 8 involved a policy on the ship Experiment. The Experiment was
captured by a Spanish privateer while on a voyage in the West Indies and then
recaptured about four hours later by a British warship. 457 The insureds attempted to
abandon the vessel, which would have allowed them to claim a total loss under the
policy. 45 8 Relying on three specific English cases, Washington set forth the rules
governing the right to abandon in cases of capture and recapture, holding on the
facts of the case there was no right to abandon.45 9
In Odlin v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania,460 the insured vessel had sailed
the day before the Embargo Act of 1807 was passed by Congress, but was detained
by adverse winds in the Delaware River where her papers were seized by revenue
officers for violation of the embargo. The plaintiff insured abandoned the vessel to
his insurers and claimed a total loss under the policy. 461 The insurer contended that
the contract should be deemed terminated because the embargo had rendered its
performance illegal.48 2 In a long opinion, Washington reviewed numerous
continental and British authorities and held that an embargo does not render a
contract unlawful, but only suspends its execution. 4 Consequently, the insurer was
still bound and the insured entitled to recover for a total loss. 46 Among the
452
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authorities Washington considered were opinions by Lord Mansfield and Lord
Kenyon as well as the works of Park and Marshall, the two leading scholars of the
day on marine insurance.465 Odlin was widely cited and praised by other judges as
an able and thorough opinion.466
The prize and marine insurance cases illustrate Washington's decisional
process and his view of law. As James Wilson had apparently taught him, law is a
system of immutable rules of right and wrong. Judges do not formulate the rules,
they "discover" them. The process of discovery is wide-ranging with the judge free
to consult all available sources as evidence of what the rules are. Except in matters
of a strictly local nature, where rules of law peculiar to the particular locality may
exist, the judge's job is to find a general rule of decision binding on everyone.
General rules are especially important in the commercial context. Commercial
activity transcends state and national boundaries. Commerce is a beneficial activity
which is to be encouraged and facilitated. Uniform rules which transcend the state
and national boundaries are therefore a benevolent way to encourage and facilitate
the free flow of commerce.4 67
C.

Western Lands

American expansion, growth, and commercial activity centered not only
on the sea, but also on the new lands in the West. Abundant, cheap land pulled the
burgeoning population westward like a magnet. Here, competing systems of land
tenure clashed as the courts struggled to develop rules to resolve legal issues
presented. At the same time, commercial interests and rules of law governing
business matters conflicted with more traditional rules governing title to real
property. In cases involving title to western lands, Justice Washington often dealt
with these issues.
Two systems of land development existed side by side in the original
colonies. 46 New England was settled by groups of people who lived together in
towns and stressed cooperative effort. 46 9 The other colonies were built on large land
grants, with echoes of feudal land tenure, to politically prominent investors. 470 The
two systems represented conflicting political goals. 47' Density of settlement, a goal
of the cooperative system, provided protection and laid the foundation for
economic growth. 472 Large grants to absentee owners, on the other hand, were
465
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designed to add revenues to the public treasury.473 Under the latter system, claims
to land lying within the large grants became a commodity with warrants and patents
trading as a medium of exchange in the economic marketplace. 474
Land speculation was common in the early republic. George Washington
and John Marshall each acquired large western claims with no intention of settling
there. Speculation in western lands destroyed the judicial career and reputation of
James Wilson, who died in a North Carolina inn hiding from his creditors. 475
Indefinite boundaries, ambiguous surveys, and "squatting" often produced
conflicting claims. Actions of state governments exacerbated the problem. 4 6 For
example, inconsistent interpretations by two state administrations in Pennsylvania
contributed to confusion surrounding claim by the Holland Land Company to
500,000 acres in the northwestern part of the state. 4n Virginia issued three different
types of warrants to its western lands in what later became the State of Kentucky.47
The warrants had competing political goals. Occupation warrants were designed to
encourage settlement; military warrants paid off veterans for service in the
Revolutionary and Indian wars; and treasury warrants raised public revenue. 479 A
claim under a warrant could be perfected into a patent or title only by a survey plat
and a certificate of settlement. 480 This system led to fraud, confusion, and a
profusion of conflicting claims.
Justice Washington was no stranger to land litigation. His first opinion as a
Supreme Court Justice, rendered seriatim in Fowler v. Lindsey,48 involved
competing claims in the "Connecticut gore," a strip of land eight miles wide
running the length of the New York-Pennsylvania border, claimed by Connecticut
4
under her sea-to-sea charter.48 2 The case was decided on a jurisdictional issue. 1
The Holland Land Company controversy, another aspect of the
"Pennsylvania Rebellion," came before Washington in several cases in the circuit
court.484 In 1792, Pennsylvania passed a statute designed to facilitate development
of potentially rich lands lying "north and west of the rivers Ohio and Allegheny,
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and Conewango Creek., 485 The statute had two objectives - to raise revenue for
the state treasury, and to secure development of the lands as a western barrier to the
Indian tribes.486 There were two methods of obtaining title to these lands.48 r First,
warrants could be purchased which would entitle the warrantees to patents if
certain settlement requirements were subsequently met.4 8 Second, actual
settlement would, if specific conditions were met, entitle the settler to a settlement
warrant which could ripen into a patent or title. 48 9 Not surprisingly, the first method
appealed to entrepreneurs who could afford to buy warrants covering large tracts,
while the second method was an invitation to individuals and families to develop
smaller parcels. 490 It is likewise not surprising that, in the charged political climate
of the day, the former method appealed to Federalists, while the latter method was
preferred by Republicans.49'
An Indian war raged on the Pennsylvania frontier from 1783 until the
Treaty of Greenville in 1795.492 The Act for the Sale of the Vacant Lands, as the
Pennsylvania statute was called, was passed while this war was in progress. 493 The
act required warrantees to begin settlement on each 400-acre tract within two years
of obtaining their warrants, and to perfect title by continuous residence for five
years thereafter.494 Those obtaining settlement warrants were obligated to fulfill the
five-year continuous residence requirement. 495 Because the legislature feared the
Indian wars would frustrate development, they placed in the statute the notorious
Section IX proviso which was to become the source of much difficulty.4 98 It read as
follows:
Provided always nevertheless, That if any such actual settler, or
any grantee in any such original or succeeding warrant, shall, by
force of arms of the enemies of the United States, be prevented
from making such actual settlement, or be driven therefrom, and
shall persist in his endeavors to make such actual settlement as
aforesaid, then, in either case, he and his heirs shall be entitled to
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have and to hold the said lands, in the same
manner as if the actual
497
settlement had been made and continued.
In 1793, the Holland Land Company invested over $200,000, a huge sum
in those days, and purchased warrants for nearly half a million acres. 498 The
company intended to develop the lands and meet the settlement requirements by
moving tenants onto the individual tracts.4 99 The company apparently believed the
settlement requirement to be postponed or excused by the Section IX proviso, for
much of the land it acquired remained unsettled during the two-year period after it
acquired its warrants.50 However,
rumours, raised and circulated by artful and interested men, and
countenanced by the obscure and equivocal language of the law,
were heard to insinuate, that the warrantees had incurred a
forfeiture of their lands, by the lapse of two years from the dates
of the warrants, notwithstanding the terms of the proviso. 1
Encouraged by such rumors, settlers poured into the Holland lands after the Treaty
of Greenville, and many of the company's tenants renounced their leases and
determined to hold the lands in their own right.50 2 In many cases, tenants recruited
by the company found the lands they were to develop occupied by "squatters" who
drove them off by force of arms.503
Crucial to the resolution of conflicting claims was the construction to be
given the Section IX proviso.504 In general, there were three contending
positions. 0 The first was that, if the holder of a warrant was prevented by Indian
hostilities from making a settlement within two years of issuance of the warrant,
the settlement and residency requirements were totally excused and the holder
could obtain a patent without further effort.5 05 Others argued that, although the
conditions were not excused, all that was required was persistent efforts to make
settlement and reside on the tract for five years; such persistent efforts entitled the
settler to a patent even if the efforts were unsuccessful.50 7 Finally, it was contended
497
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that the proviso merely postponed the conditions and that title could be obtained
only if cessation of hostilities were followed by settlement S0within
two years and
8
satisfaction of the five-year residency requirement thereafter.
Adoption of the third alternative would have cost the Holland company
over half of its land. 50 9 Under the Federalist government, which held power in
Pennsylvania prior to 1799, the interpretation that the proviso dispensed with the
settlement requirement was adopted and the company was granted patents to much
of its land.510 The ensuing outcry from settlers holding adversely to the Holland
company and their bitter political backlash against the Federalist position were
51
factors contributing to Republican victory in Pennsylvania in the 1799 elections. '
The new government changed its position and now held that the proviso merely
postponed the settlement requirement.5 12 The Holland company responded by
bringing a mandamus action to compel the state to deliver the remainder of its
patents.513 In a split decision, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania adhered to the
third construction, and dismissed the suit. 14 The legislature, unable to pass a bill
directly resolving the controversy, ordered that a second suit, upon a trial with
feigned issues, be held to decide the matter.5 15 The Holland Land Company refused
to participate in the trial.516 Nevertheless, the result was inconclusive and added to
the confusion. The Court adopted the Republican position that the proviso merely
postponed the settlement requirement, but held also that each case must turn on its
own peculiar facts as to whether the settlement requirement had been met.517 Thus,
each individual title dispute became a jury question.
Frustrated in its efforts to obtain relief from the legislature or through the
courts of Pennsylvania, the Holland Land Company turned to the federal circuit
court in Philadelphia. Here, no doubt, they expected to encounter a sympathetic ear
from Federalists Washington and Peters. Curiously, the first case to come before
the circuit court involving title to lands covered by the 1792 act was not a Holland
company case. Balfour's Lessee v. Meade518 involved conflicting claims, both of
which were based on settlement rights. Nevertheless, the parties fairly represented
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the Federalist and Republican positions."' l Balfour was an army surgeon stationed
in 1793 at Fort Franklin in western Pennsylvania.52 He attempted to obtain
settlement rights to five tracts intending to lodge tenants there.52' During six or
seven days in 1793 Balfour, with some soldiers, built crude, incomplete cabins on
the tracts; later, Balfour had the tracts surveyed and obtained settlement warrants
for two of them. 5 In 1794, Meade, finding the tracts unoccupied, built cabins there
and, a year later, moved in with his family.523 Balfour sued through his lessee to
eject Meade, claiming that the Indian wars had prevented him from completing the
residence requirement.52
In a straightforward opinion, Washington first concluded that Balfour's
activities fell short of actual settlement as contemplated by the statute. 525 He then
turned to the issue of whether Balfour came within the proviso excusing the
settlement requirement in the case of Indian hostilities. 25 Washington reasoned that
without an "incipient title... created by actual settlement" 527 Balfour could not
take advantage of the proviso.5 28 To obtain an incipient title, he reasoned, one had
to make sufficient efforts at settlement to evince a bona fide intention to reside on
the land. 29 Washington distinguished the two state cases, which he described as
"the Holland Company v. Coxe, and the feigned issue tried at Sunbury,"530 on the
ground that they involved warrants authorized by the act, while the source of the
incipient title in Balfour was settlement."'
The Holland Land Company must have found little comfort in
Washington's Balfour opinion. His reasoning was based entirely on construction of
the specific words of the 1792 Pennsylvania statute. s 2 He had effectively sided
with the small family farmer who had "squatted" on Balfour's claim, and against
an aspirant landlord who planned to move tenants onto the land.533 Washington's
519
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family and circle of close associates included many who speculated in western
lands intending to become large absentee landlords. His Federalist principles were
consistent with the concept of land development as a commercial venture. If he
brought any prejudices derived from this background to Balfour, however, he was
able to set them aside and decide the case narrowly, relying on the specific words
of the statute.534
In 1804, the Holland Land company, suing through its land agent, Harm
Jan Huidekoper, filed several ejectment actions in the United States Circuit Court
for the District of Pennsylvania. One of these, Huidekoper v. Stiles,53 was
dismissed on a pleading point. In two others, Huidekoper v. Burrus,5 and
Huidekoper v. McClean,53 r Washington, certainly to the chagrin of the plaintiff,
adopted the third interpretation of the Section IX proviso. The object of the 1792
act, he reasoned, was population and improvement of the country.5s What mattered
was settlement and improvement, not endeavors to do so. The statutory purpose
would be frustrated if settlement and improvement were not pursued to
completion.539 In McClean, he summarized his conclusion as follows:
The only way therefore to make sense of the law, and to comply
with the manifest intention of the legislature, is to construe the
proviso as requiring the party to do that, after the impediments had
ceased, which he must have performed had they never existed. He
must persist until his endeavors are crowned with success. Instead
of being obliged, at the risk of his life, to improve within two
years from the date of his warrant, and to reside for five, it is
enough, under the proviso, if he does the same things after the
prevention had ceased.540
Washington had adopted what was essentially the Republican position.
This was too much for Judge Peters. A fourth case, Huidekoper's Lessee v.
Douglass,54 1 carried the issue to the Supreme Court of the United States upon a
certificate of division between Washington and Peters. The report of the case on
remand after the Supreme Court had ruled states that Washington "had delivered a
charge to the jury, coinciding, generally, with the construction given by the
supreme court of Pennsylvania, to the act of April, 1792, from which Judge Peters

534

See id.

535

12 F. Cas. 850 (C.C.D. Pa. 1804).

536

See 12 F. Cas. 840 (C.C.D. Pa. 1804) (No. 6848).

537

See 12 F. Cas. 848 (C.C.D. Pa. 1804) (No. 6852).

538

See id.

539

See Burrus, 12 F. Cas. at 842.

540

McLean, 12 F. Cas. at 850.

541

7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 1 (1805).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol102/iss4/4

58

Faber: Justice Bushrod Washington and the Age of Discovery in American L

2000]

JUSTICE BUSHROD WASHINGTON

dissented., 5 42 When the case came before the Supreme Court, Chief Justice
Marshall wrote for the Court and, relying on close construction of the words of the
statute, held that persistent efforts to make settlement within two years of receipt of
a warrant excused the settlement and residence requirements altogether. 54 3 Marshall
directly rejected Washington's argument that the purpose of the statute would be
frustrated if actual settlement and residence were not completed. 544 Settlement of
the country, he said, was not for the exclusive purpose of the statute; raising money
for the treasury was also an objective.,54 It fs implicit in Marshall's opinion that
those who have paid money into the treasury for their warrants should be given
every indulgence in perfecting their titles, otherwise there would be a disincentive
546
to invest and the objective of raising revenue for the state would be frustrated.
Having thus disposed of the issue by construction of the statute, Marshall,
in dicta, chastised the Pennsylvania legislature for changing the rules after the
initial warrants were issued to the Holland Land Company. 47 In doing so he
interjected overtones of the contract clause, an issue which had not been previously
raised in any of the cases. Marshall said:
This is a contract, and although a state is a party, it ought to be
construed according to those well established principles which
regulate contracts generally. The state is in the situation of a
person, who holds forth to the world the conditions, on which he
is willing to sell his property. If he should couch his propositions
in such ambiguous terms that they might be understood
differently: in consequences of which sales were to be made, and
the purchase money paid, he would come with an ill grace into
court to insist on a latent and obscure meaning, which should give
him back his property, and permit him to retain the purchase
money. All those principles of equity and fair dealing, which
constitute the basis of judicial proceedings,
require that courts
5
should lean against such a construction. 4
In Marshall's dictum, Huidekoper'sLessee v. Douglassis a forerunner of the great
contract clause cases which were to come a few years later.- 49
When the case came back to the Circuit Court, Washington dutifully
instructed the jury:
542
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[A warrantee who] was prevented, by the enemies of the United
States, from making such settlement as the law required, but who,
during that period, persisted in his endeavors to make such
settlement, is entitled to hold his land in fee simple, although, after
the prevention ceased, he made no attempt to make such
must consider the law of the land, and govern
settlement. This we
5 50
our decision by it.
The Holland Land Company seemed to have won, but its victory was a
nebulous one. The state courts continued to apply their own interpretation of the
law as set forth in Commonwealth v. Coxe and Attorney General v. The
55 Another collision with the federal authority did not occur, however,
Grantees.'
because the state courts usually found for the company upon the facts of the
particular cases. 52 As in the Olmstead affair, the state remained defiant on the
surface, but avoided further direct conflict with federal power. In sharp contrast to
his position in the Olmstead matter, Washington had come down on Pennsylvania's
side in the Holland lands controversy. When his positions in three "Pennsylvania

Rebellion" controversies are compared - United States v. Bright, United States v.
Fisher, and the Huidekoper's Lessee cases - Washington emerges as a justice

committed to the rule of law who was capable of setting aside politics and his own
predispositions in order to apply what he perceived to be controlling legal
principles. In Fisherand in Huidekoper he was reversed by the Supreme Court, and
in Bright the impact of his ruling was minimized by President Madison's pardon of
the offenders. Nevertheless, in the three cases Washington emerges as a justice of
principle and courage, above politics and the passions of the moment.
The chaotic state of land titles in western Pennsylvania represented by the
Holland Land Company cases was repeated on a larger scale in Kentucky and
Ohio. Warrants were freely assigned and sold. It was not uncommon for purchasers
who had developed their property to be confronted, sometimes years after the
original warrants had issued, with adverse claims made by descendants of the
original warrantees. A number of these cases reached the Supreme Court in the
1820's and Washington frequently authored the Court's opinions.
Hugh Stevenson was a colonel in the Virginia line during the
Revolutionary War who died in the service of his country. 5m His rank entitled his
representatives to a warrant for 6,666 & 2/3 acres of land in that portion of Ohio
reserved by Virginia for payment of its veterans. Colonel Stevenson had two
illegitimate children by Ann Whaley whom he later married. A third son, Richard
Stevenson, born to the couple after their marriage, died before reaching his
majority. Before his death, however, Richard received a warrant to Ohio military
lands as payment for his father's services. The warrant passed on Richard's death
550

Douglass, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 400.

551

See HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 322.

552

See id.

553

Stevenson Heirs v. Sullivant, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 207 (1820).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol102/iss4/4

60

Faber: Justice Bushrod Washington and the Age of Discovery in American L
2000]

JUSTICEBUSHROD WASHINGTON

to his uncle, John Stevenson, Richard's heir under Virginia law. John Stevenson
sold or assigned the warrant which became the basis for a*claim of ownership by
one Sullivant. Years later, Sullivant was sued by Colonel Stevenson's two
illegitimate children. The two children claimed the warrants should have been
issued to them under Colonel Stevenson's will which divided his estate equally
between them and their mother.5 4
In a short opinion by Washington, 555 the Supreme Court held for the
defendant and dismissed the claim of the two children. The opinion first evaded the
question of whether Ohio or Virginia law was to control. 56 Because the parties
acknowledged that Virginia law was more favorable to the plaintiffs, Washington
reasoned, he had to analyze their case under that law. 55 7 He then concluded that the
plaintiffs were not within the term "representatives" of their father as that term was
used in the Virginia statute providing for military warrants; that the plaintiffs were
not made legitimate under Virginia law by the subsequent marriage of their parents
and their father's acknowledgment 5of
them; and that, as illegitimate children, they
58
could not inherit from their brother.
The case turned entirely on Washington's analysis of Virginia law. There
is no mention of the significant issues of public policy bubbling beneath the
surface, such as the conflict between the goals of certainty in land titles and the
facilitation of commerce by allowing warrants to circulate as commercial paper.5 59
The effect of the decision, however, was to come down solidly on the side of
certainty of titles. As he had done in the Holland land cases, Washington rendered a
decision which tended to favor owners in possession - 5the
persons who had
60
expended their wealth and energy in developing the property.
The situation in Kentucky had become so chaotic that the state legislature
twice took action to protect its citizens who, after development of their lands, were
evicted by those holding superior titles. The first statute, passed in 1797, absolved
evicted claimants from liability for rents and profits attributable to the periods
during which they occupied the properties. 56 ' The second, in 1812, required nonoccupying superior claimants to compensate occupants for their possession,
including any improvements made.5 Both statutes were in direct conflict with the
common law which, not only made the evictee liable for rents and profits, but
decreed that any improvements made would become the property of the evicting
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owner. The Kentucky statutes directly contradicted a proviso in the 1789 compact
between Kentucky and Virginia which permitted Kentucky to become a state.
The compact specified that all private rights and interests in land in the new state
would remain valid and be determined by then existing Virginia law.
The Kentucky statutes were tested in Green v. Biddle,564 which reached the
Supreme Court in 1821. In a short opinion by Justice Story, the Court found for
Green, the absentee owner, holding the Kentucky statutes to be in violation of the
compact between the two states and "consequently unconstitutional. 5' 65 Story's
opinion is uncharacteristically short and vague. "[Biy the general principles of law,
and from the necessity of the case," said Story, "titles to real estate
566 can be
determined only by the laws of the state under which they are acquired.
The decision produced a storm of controversy. Responding to this case and
Cohens v. Virginia,5 67 decided the same term, Kentucky Senator Richard Mentor
Johnson, later Vice President of the United States, led a vitriolic attack on the
federal judiciary. 56 Henry Clay, recently Speaker of the House of Representatives
and Kentucky's leading lawyer, moved for a rehearing on the ground that Biddle
had not been represented at the first hearing and because the case "involved the
rights and claims of numerous occupants of land in Kentucky. ' 56 9 Clay was well
familiar with the problem. He had served unsuccessfully as one of two
commissioners appointed by Kentucky to travel to Richmond and try to reach a
compromise with the Virginia legislature. 570 The motion for rehearing was granted
and the case was reargued for an entire week in March, 1822.571 The Supreme
Court waited almost a year before handing down its new decision, perhaps hoping
the furor would abate.
This time Washington spoke for the Court. He wrote with characteristic
directness posing two questions: Are the rights and interests in Kentucky lands as
secure under the 1797 and 1812 acts as they were under the laws of Virginia at the
time of Kentucky's separation? 572 If not, are those statutes unconstitutional?573
There followed a long opinion drawing on a wide array of authorities. Perhaps
Washington hoped to convince the country there could be no doubt about the way
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the case should come out. He reviewed the English common law of property and
Virginia law at the time of Kentucky's separation and concluded that "the
successful claimant of land in Virginia, who recovers in ejectment, was at all times
entitled to recover rents and profits in an action of trespass. . . ."574 He then found
no principle of equity exempting application of the legal principle.575 Normally,
Washington would have stopped at this point, satisfied with a short, direct opinion,
supported by controlling authority. But in Green v. Biddle he pressed on.57 He
looked at doctrines of the civil law, citing authorities such as Puffendorf. His
objective was to show that the civil law was consistent with the principles of
common law and equity on which he relied. It "can hardly be asserted," 5 he then
declared, answering the first question posed, that the rights of owners were as
secure under Kentucky law as they had been under the laws of Virginia. Finally, he
turned to the contract clause and found it offended by the Kentucky statutes5 78
Impairment of the obligation of a contract, he concluded, "can never depend upon
the extent of the change which the law effects in it. Any deviation from its terms..
. impairs its obligation." 5 79 He had no difficulty finding the interstate compact in
question to be a contract; a contract is simply any agreement between two or more
parties.
Washington acknowledged that "a great diversity of opinion prevails in
[Kentucky] upon the question we have been examining. ' 's8' He then concluded:
However this may be, we hold ourselves answerable to God, our
consciences and our country, to decide this question according to
the dictates of our best judgment, be the consequences of our
decision what they may.58'
It has been suggested that Green v. Biddle, at least on its surface, is "a
curious, almost reckless decision"55 2 and so it seems. The Court could have
avoided the public outcry and found for Kentucky on the simple ground that the
interstate compact in question had not been approved by the federal government as
required by the Constitution. 5a8 Washington found there to be an implicit approval,
however, in federal legislation admitting Kentucky to the union as a new state. Or,
574

Id.at 77.

575

See ji.

576

See id.

577

Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 84.

578

See id

579

Id.

580

M at 93.

581

Id. at 93.

582

WHITE, supra note 15, at 646.

583

See Green, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 1.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2000

63

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 102, Iss. 4 [2000], Art. 4
798

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 102:735

as Professor White suggests, the Court could have used the compact clause to
divert some of the public criticism toward Congress. Under this line of reasoning
the Kentucky statute would be deemed to be "trumped" by the compact under the
federal supremacy clause of Article VI. Congress could therefore be blamed for
upsetting Kentucky's property laws because it had approved the compact. This
would have diverted criticism away from the Supreme Court.Sm In choosing to
ground its decision on the contract clause, the Court struck a blow for vested
property rights. 8 5 Title to property is to be determined by the law of the state where
the property is located, as the Court was to hold in several cases, but once title is
determined, the state should not tinker with rights traditionally associated with
ownership.
One year after the decision in Green v. Biddle, Washington again wrote for
the Court in a western lands case. In Kerr v. Devisees of Moon, 588 the Court directly
confronted the issue of whether land warrants were commercial paper.5 87 Archibald
Moon was one of the hundreds of Revolutionary War veterans paid for their
services by an allotment of western land. 88 Moon claimed 4,000 acres in the
Virginia military district of Ohio.58 9 This district had been reserved by Virginia for
payment of her veterans when her western lands were relinquished to the federal
government. Moon had two families, four children by a first wife, and six by a
second. 590 Moon died in 1796 and, by a will probated in Kentucky, he left his
military land to his second wife and her children, disinheriting his first family.59 ' In
1809, two of Moon's children by his first wife assigned his military claim to Robert
Price, who sold it to Kerr.5 92 Moon's children by his second wife sued in equity in
federal court in Ohio, seeking an order compelling Kerr to assign the warrants he
had bought from Price back to them.5 93 The determinative issue in the case was the
character of the warrants as real or personal property. 94 If realty, Ohio law would
control, and Moon's will, never probated in Ohio, could not operate to determine
title to property there.595 If personalty, title to the warrants would be determined
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under the laws of Kentucky, the state of Moon's domicile at his death.596 In a short
opinion, Washington declined to accord the distinction any significance. Even if
personalty, he reasoned, the warrants relate to real estate in Ohio. The matters must
therefore be resolved under the laws of the place where the land is located.597 The
practical effect of the decision was to lend certainty to the titles of those in
possession of Ohio lands by making it more difficult for absentee claimants to
establish their titles.
McCormick v. Sullivant,598 decided a year after Devisees of Moon,
reaffirmed the rule that title to land can pass only by the laws of the state where the
lands are located. William Crawford had been a colonel in the continental army
and, as such, was entitled to a warrant to 6,666 & 2/3 acres of land between the
Scioto and Little Miami rivers in Ohio.599 His will, probated in Pennsylvania, left
his estate in equal parts to his son, John Crawford, and his two daughters, the
plaintiffs.r °° The warrant was issued, subsequent to William Crawford's death, to
his son John from whom the defendants derived their title. Relying upon United
States v. Crosby,r°1 and Devisees of Moon, Washington's opinion held that probate
of the will in Pennsylvania was insufficient to pass title to lands in Ohio.
With the exception of Green v. Biddle, Washington's western lands
opinions disclose a preference for local law and generally favor those in possession
over absentee claimants. This preference for possessors is explained in Holtzapple
v. Phillibaum,602 which involved competing claims to land in Cumberland County,
Pennsylvania. Washington pointed out that a warrant or license which has not been
perfected by a patent, or full payment of the purchase money, is merely an
equitable, and not a legal, title. 0 3 A junior claim, he held, followed up by due
diligence, will take precedence over an older equitable title "inasmuch
' 6 4 as the
equity on which it is founded would be superior to that of the elder title. 0
In land disputes, as in other types of cases, Washington pursued clear rules
and predictable results. Because land law varied from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,
this goal could only be achieved through the application of local law. A general
common law of property applied by the federal courts would have merely added to
the confusion. 605 Additionally, Washington clearly believed the equities in close
cases to lie with those in possession who had invested their wealth and labor in
596
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developing the land. Green v. Biddle is not inconsistent with this pattern, for the
case goes beyond the simple issue of who owns the property and presents an
additional question: If ownership is determined to lie with the absentee claimant, to
what extent may a state alter established concepts of what ownership entails? On
this issue, Washington in Green falls back on traditional Federalist notions of the
sanctity of private property. With the example of the French Revolution before
them, Federalists feared mob rule and saw in the institution of private property a
fortress of protection against the excesses of popular government. The contract
clause was viewed as "a bulwark in favor of personal security and private
rights., 608 Green v. Biddle is therefore at bottom an opinion designed to protect
vested property rights from usurpation by a state legislature. 0 7 As such, it is not
inconsistent with Washington's other western lands decisions.
D.

Slavery and FederalCrimes

Washington's circuit court cases on slavery and federal criminal law reveal
his humanity and basic decency more than any of his other cases. But, despite the
sympathy for slaves expressed in his opinions and his enduring support for eventual
emancipation, it was an incident involving his own slaves which cast the only blot
on his character.
When George Washington died in 1799, he left a life estate in Mount
Vernon to his wife with a remainder over to his nephew, Bushrod Washington. 8°
The devise to Bushrod was a source of discord in the Washington family. President
Washington's brother, Lawrence, who had cared for Mount Vernon during the
Revolutionary War, expected to inherit the property himself and his disappointment
created a serious breach with his nephew.60 9 Martha Washington may have tried to
remedy the problem by making specific bequests to other family members.610
Although Bushrod had managed her affairs during her widowhood, her will left all
her personal property, including the furnishings and supplies of Mount Vernon, to
others.611 Thus, Bushrod inherited a huge house, in need of repairs, and four
thousand acres of property, without furniture, farm implements, or supplies.612 To
live at Mount Vernon and work the plantation, he borrowed nearly four thousand
dollars.613 Additionally, in compliance with a directive in George Washington's
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will, Bushrod freed the Mount Vernon slaves on Martha Washington's death.6 14 He
moved his own slaves onto the plantation, but615these must have been far fewer in
number than those freed under his uncle's will.
Bushrod Washington never recovered financially from the burden of
Mount Vernon, yet he remained determined to hold the plantation at all costs. From
1802 to 1822, he operated Mount Vernon at annual losses between five hundred
and one thousand dollars.6 16 His salary as a federal judge was $3,500 a year until
1819 when it was raised to $4,500.617 He was required to extend the original loan
enabling him to operate Mount Vernon.6 18 At the same time, Washington's family
obligations were significant. His wife, Ann Blackburn, to whom he was devoted,
was a semi-invalid, sensitive, and insecure; she required his continual care and
attention.6 19 Bushrod and Ann Washington had no children of their own, but when
Bushrod's brother Corbin died a widower, Bushrod and Ann took in his three sons
and raised them as their own.620
President Washington, in addition to the Mount Vernon house and lands,
left his personal papers to his nephew.6 2' Bushrod felt a responsibility to use these
papers in preparation of a biography of his famous uncle.622 He also saw a chance
in this project to relieve his financial burdens. 623 He recruited John Marshall to
write the biography and the two agreed to split the profits.6 24 From the beginning
the project was a disaster.6 25 Washington and Marshall made extravagant
predictions of expected sales and were wildly optimistic as to when the manuscript
would be ready.626 When Marshall finally completed the first volume, it had
practically nothing to do with George Washington's life; instead, it was a long
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"introduction" tracing the entire history of the American colonies. 62 7 The publisher
lost money due to the length and prolixity of the volumes, and subscribers, weary
of the long delays in publication, withdrew their support.6 8 The project totally
failed to relieve the financial pressures upon them, as both Washington and
Marshall had hoped.
In order to pay his debts, Washington sold off parts of the Mount Vernon
estate6 29 and, in 1821, he sold some of the Mount Vernon slaves. 3 Washington's
insensitivity to the plight of his slaves is the only thing raising any question about
his character. His actions were inconsistent with his previous attitude toward
slavery and his judicial decisions involving slaves. He appears to have been driven
to the decision by his financial difficulties and the slaves' rebellious conduct
stemming from their belief that he would eventually emancipate them. 63 1
Like many Southern landowners, Bushrod Washington saw slavery as a
moral evil even while owning slaves. He was active in the hopeless, but popular
movement to send the slaves back to Africa. Washington endorsed the African
colonization movement and served as the first president of the American
Colonization Society.63 2 His opinions evince sympathy for the plight of American
slaves and a propensity to construe the legal rules in favor of freedom.
In Pierce v. Tumer,633 Washington held for the Supreme Court that a
marriage settlement, conveying the wife's land and slaves to trustees, by a deed to
which her husband was a party, protects the property from the husband's creditors.
The slaves were thereby allowed to remain in the company of their mistress4 of
many years instead of being sold to satisfy the debts of her deceased husband.6
Butler v. Hopper,63 5 a premonition of Dred Scott, surely aroused much
public interest when it came on for trial before the circuit court in Philadelphia. The
plaintiff, Pierce Butler, was a member of Congress from South Carolina where he
owned a large plantation. 63 6 From 1794, to the time of the suit, he kept a dwelling
in Philadelphia where he lived continuously except for an annual visit to his
southern plantations.63 7 Butler kept Ben, a domestic servant, with him in
627
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Philadelphia and took Ben to South Carolina on his annual visitsYm With the
exception of two years between 1796 and 1800, when he served in the South
Carolina legislature, Butler was continuously a member of Congress until 1805.6 9
In 1805, the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas issued a writ of habeas corpus
discharging Ben from Butler's service on the ground that under Pennsylvania law
he had been emancipated by residence in a free state. 64 0 Butler attacked the state
court decision on two grounds. He first argued that, as a mere sojourner in
Pennsylvania, he came within an exception to the statute under which Ben claimed
his freedom; next, he claimed benefit of a statutory exemption applying to members
of Congress. 64 1 Washington's jury charge was, in effect, a directed verdict for the
defendant.64 2 There is ample evidence, he said, from which the jury may conclude
Butler had acquired a new domicile in Pennsylvania and was therefore not a
sojourner.4 Additionally, Washington continued, because during two of the years
he resided in Philadelphia he was not a member of Congress, Butler had lost his
congressional immunity. 64 4 Ben was allowed to remain free.
Years later, in Ex parteSimmons,64 5 Washington refused a certificate under
the Fugitive Slave Act to the owner of a runaway slave who brought him to
Philadelphia from Charleston, South Carolina, and kept him there for ten months.
Under the 1780 Pennsylvania statute providing for the gradual emancipation of
slaves, Washington held, the exception for sojourners did not apply to one who
kept a slave in the state over six months. 4 6
Washington v. Preston64 7 involved a resourceful slave named Tom who,
after running away, was captured by his owner's agent and delivered to a jailer for
safekeeping. The captor had obtained a certificate under the Fugitive Slave Act that
Tom was a fugitive. Placed in the courtyard of the jail with other prisoners to await
his supper, Tom escaped anew by going over the wall. Tom's owner sued the jailer
for damages on the theory that the jailer had breached a bailment. Washington
instructed the jury there was no bailment in the absence of a promise to pay the
jailer a reward for safekeeping. 648 The jury returned a verdict for the defendant. 64 9
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Like the cases on slavery, Washington's opinions in criminal cases reveal
his concept of a judge's role and his judicial temperament. He held the government
to high standards in criminal cases. In United States v. Morrow,650 the defendant in
a counterfeiting case was acquitted after Washington charged the jury that a
counterfeit half dollar must sufficiently resemble a real one to deceive a person of
ordinary intelligence. "[I]t seems to the court," he opined, that the coin in question
was "a miserable imitation of the genuine half dollar."' 651 In another case, one
Craig was found in possession of notes of the Bank of United States, some
counterfeit and some genuine. The genuine notes were probably used as patterns
for the bogus ones. Government agents seized all of the notes. After his conviction
on a charge of counterfeiting,6 2 Craig sued to compel the government to return to
him the genuine notes. Washington agreed and ordered the notes returned to Craig
3
to enable him to pay for his defense on the counterfeiting charge!6
United States v. Handa5 4 resulted from an unfortunate intersection of
cultural misunderstanding, alcohol, and firearms. The Russian charge d'affaires in
Philadelphia held a large party at his house to celebrate the coronation of the
Emperor of Russia. In an effort to symbolize and salute the friendship between his
government and the United States he displayed at one of his second story windows
a painting showing a ship under an American flag entering a Russian port over
which was placed a crown. A rabble gathered in the street, insulted that the Russian
crown was placed above the American flag, and began to throw bricks and rocks at
the house. Hand, who lived nearby and was intoxicated, went home and shortly
returned with two large pistols which he discharged at the second story windows of
the charge d'affaires' house. Hand was indicted for assaulting a foreign officer and
offering violence to the person of a foreign minister, but claimed he did not know it
was the Russian minister's house. Washington, in his charge to the jury,
condemned Hand's conduct as an outrage which deserved to be punished, but said
the jury must acquit him of the crimes charged unless they determined he knew the
house was that of the Russian minister. The jury found Hand not guilty. 5 5
The cases on slavery and crimes reflect Washington's personality and
judicial temperament. A patrician by birth and training, he did not lose sympathy
for the misfortunate and those in distress.
V. CONCLUSION

Justice Washington's reputation, secure in his own day, has suffered with
the passage of time. He is often represented as lacking in perceptiveness and
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dominated intellectually by Marshall and Story. 65 6 Such assessments may spring
from an unfortunate choice of words by Joseph Story. In a eulogy, Story described
Washington's mind as "slow, but not torpid. '657 When considered in context with
Story's other descriptive comments, it is probable he meant by this that Washington
was slow in the sense of being careful and taking time to form an opinion. For
Story also says Washington was "sagacious" and "forcible in conception, clear in
reasoning. ,65 ' Describing Washington's performance in oral argument, Horace
Binney, who appeared before him many times, said that he had "a great quickness
and accuracy of apprehension" and that he "caught the important parts in a
moment." 65 9 At another point in his memorial Binney observed: "His mind was
full, his elocution free, clear and accurate, his command of all about him
indisputable. His learning and acuteness were not only equal to the profoundest
argument, but often carried Counsel to depths which they had not penetrated." 660
David Paul Brown, another member of the Philadelphia bar, said
Washington absolutely excelled as a trial judge. He was perhaps, said Brown, "the
greatest nisi prius judge the world has ever known, not excepting Chief Judge Holt
or Lord Mansfield., 66 1 Washington brought to the trial bench one of the most
significant attributes a trial lawyer or judge can have - a knack for nearly perfect
recall of the evidence. He took few notes during a trial, preferring to concentrate on
the witnesses and their demeanor. 6 2 Nevertheless, he was able to deliver long jury
charges immediately upon conclusion of the evidence, summing up for the jury
from memory, ' and using only rough notes as to the law.6 4
Princeton, Harvard and the University of Pennsylvania conferred honorary
LL.D. degrees upon Washington. 66S His opinions are proof of his learning and his
powers of precise analysis.
Associated with Marshall and Story in the public mind, and allied with
them in most of the great constitutional decisions of the era, Washington's judicial
style differed significantly from their's. While Marshall's great opinions often
disdain the citation of authority and rely on internal reasoning, Washington's
opinions were usually based on precedent and what he considered to be controlling
authority. While Story's opinions tend to be long discourses on the law, liberally
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adorned with obiter dicta, Washington's are precise and to the point, rarely
extending beyond the specific issues necessary for resolution of the case.
Washington was much less the "activist" judge than Marshall and Story and did
not, as they frequently did, look for opportunities to address points of public policy
not essential to resolution of the case.
Washington accepted the challenges of the "age of discovery" and
confronted the multitude of issues presented by the rapid pace of change during his
three decades on the bench. He looked for answers, however, in what had gone
before. Merchants, businessmen, citizens, those charged with crimes, needed clear
rules to govern their conduct, rules to rely on. Washington developed the rules out
of the tapestry of the past. He wrote for the Supreme Court in areas where the
literature of the law was rich and comparatively well-developed - admiralty and
maritime cases, commercial law, real property. These materials he mined for
answers to the questions presented, answers dictated not so much by the policies
involved as by the solutions others had found. In this sense he was a profound
conservative in an active, dynamic age.
A convinced Federalist, Washington was committed to judicial review and
the vested rights of property, the twin guardians of Federalist principle and the
rights of "the sovereign people" against temporary legislative majorities and "mob
rule." However, he was much less likely than Marshall or Story to use the law to
enhance federal power at the expense of the states. He sought instead to avoid
direct conflicts with the states, for he understood that overuse of judicial authority
would deteriorate the prestige of the Court. Late in his career in 1829, he said that
he had always assumed good will on the part of state legislatures in order to avoid
giving offense to the states.66 His western lands opinions illustrate this philosophy.
To lend certainty to the law and due deference to the states, the rules determining
contested claims to real property should depend on local law; only when the states
interfere with traditional vested rights of owners, as in Green v. Biddle, will the
Court step in and overrule the state legislature.
Similarly, the quest for dependable rules on which merchants and others
can reliably base their conduct is illustrated by the maritime cases. For Washington,
it is more important to have a precise, reliable rule than to achieve equitable results
in individual cases. The occasional individual injustice is more than outweighed by
the social utility of a dependable general principle.
Justice Washington deserves better treatment than he has received at the
hand of history. Because he was content to work behind the scenes and accept a
modest public role, his full importance to the work of the Marshall Court is hidden
from us. The fact that his correspondence with Marshall has been largely lost 7
contributes to the obscurity surrounding his influence. The proposition that his
influence was great, however, 6is
proven by the fact that the "positions Washington
68
advanced regularly prevailed.
The great constitutional decisions of the Marshall Court were
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807

controversial. To stand as fundamental law, they had to win acceptance in the
marketplace of ideas. Overreaching by the Court could have made this difficult or
impossible. Given Washington's close relationships with Marshall and Story, and
the contrast between his style and theirs, we may speculate that his moderating
influence enhanced the wisdom of the great constitutional decisions by restricting
their reach.
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